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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Trait-space Monitoring for Emergent Misalignment during Supervised Finetuning

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Abstract

Emergent misalignment (EM) occurs when narrow finetuning induces dangerous behavior outside the finetuning task. Detecting this shift through repeated behavioral evaluation is costly, motivating our checkpoint-level monitoring from internal representations. We define a fixed coordinate system from seven alignment-relevant activation directions and use it to track representational drift during LoRA finetuning of four open-source 7–9B language models. Finetuning drift in this space exhibits a dominant axis that explains 78.6% of variance and remains stable across datasets, extraction choices, and parameter-update capacities. Across 468 checkpoints from three EM-relevant held-out datasets, the resulting monitors attain 1.8% FNR, 2.0% FPR, and 0.989 AUROC, outperforming semantic, random, PCA, and SAE feature baselines. On a fourth dataset, a matched benign-dangerous control shows that substantial representational drift can also occur under benign finetuning, while changes across the 7D profile still distinguish dangerous from benign runs. Stress tests across two 14B models, full finetuning, longer training horizons, and misaligned starting states show that the signal can persist across shifts in training configuration, while reliable deployment may require recalibration.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
emergement, misalignment, persona, llm, ai safety, monitor

Reviews

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.67 over 3 reviews, above 70% of the others.
Reviewer_CQMjOpenReview ↗
Rating
3(+1)
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

The authors come up with a novel method for detecting emergent misalignment while one finetunes LLM. Instead of conventionally making model generate answers to some questions and judge those answers, their method monitor changes in the model's hidden states within some low dimensional space (which captures notions like honesty, power-seeking etc.) and predicts if the model is misligned using a linear prodictor eventually (whose input is the change in hidden states along that small space). They report high (it is very close to 100%) detection accuracy on heldout training benchmarks.

Critical strengths

S1) the approach is novel to my knowledge

S2) Well written paper easy to follow very quickly I got the idea.

Critical weaknesses

The method requires some (here it is 115) forward passes at every evaluation checkpoint, which require to extract activations. It is still computationally expensive (but I accept it is probably much cheaper than evaluating the model on several prompts). In addition to that your method requires to construct a supervised learning dataset which require a lot of LLM evaluation (which is another cost that may be preliminary).

W1) Therefore, to be practical (under these preliminary costs) the method should be generalizable a lot. the heldout datasets on which they test the approach are coming from kind of the same family of emergent misalignment benchmarks in the literature. therefore the current results aren't showing generalizability of the method to fundamentally different datasets or misalignment types. Also see Q1

W2) Another thing is: I dont see why would one need to check model's alignment with such high frequency? (for instance you evaluated at every 10 iterations) (that is the regime your method becomes useful otherwise ordinary LLM judge with generation is a better approach because it may even be cheaper than the initial cost in your approach). Therefore, I am not sure if the problem you are solving a real problem?

Questions for authors

Q0) Please answer to the W2. (your answer to this question is quite important for me). ALso it would be great to pareto frontier curves for see cost vs perfromance (by defining a useful and practically relevant performance) curve of both approaches (the one you have and LLM judge one).

Q1) Could you try to find fundamentally different heldout benchmark on which you test your method so that we see if this is practically something useful?

Q2) Even, some misalignment behavior may be further fundamentally different that it is not captured by the 7 directions you mention? (this is one step further than Q1).

4 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer CQMj

We thank the reviewer for praising our paper’s novelty and clarity. We first provide clarification on the cost and benefit tradeoff (Q0/W2). Then, we provide empirical results on two different held out EM datasets (Q1/W1) and provide a summary of practical recipes informed by our experiments.

Q0/W2 - Practical value and monitoring cost

This is an insightful question. We first note that the 10-step interval is deliberately chosen to provide higher granularity in characterizing EM onset; practitioners, however, may select the monitoring cadence according to their needs and computation budget.

We further provide the following cost-benefit analysis on our system to illustrate the practical boundary. On a single NVIDIA A6000, our monitor requires 6.6-11 seconds per checkpoint, compared with approximately 34 seconds for behavior evaluation (18.7 seconds for generation and 15.5 s for GPT-4o-judging). Based on provider’s pricing, behavior evaluation costs roughly 0.09 dollar per checkpoint. Per-model calibration requires approx. 1.9 GPU hours plus $14 in judge cost, amortized after about 14 repeatedly monitor runs under our benchmark setting.

Cost–detection-delay comparison. To evaluate the practical benefit, we compare three monitoring strategies on the same 36 held-out finetuning runs: (1) final-only behavioral evaluation, which generates and grades responses only at the last checkpoint, (2) dense behavioral evaluation, which performs generation and grading at every checkpoint, and (3) our canary, which monitors activations at every checkpoint and triggers behavioral evaluation only when an alarm fires. We measure the evaluation cost and the delay between the first behaviorally dangerous checkpoint and its detection. Training is assumed to stop once danger is behaviorally confirmed.

StrategyMean cost/runMean detection delay
Final-only behavioral evaluation$0.09176 steps
Dense behavioral evaluation$0.6940 steps
Our canary + behavioral confirmation$0.0901.7 steps

_Our framework is designed for computing at scale._For short and/or one-off training run, simply final-checkpoint behavioral evaluation would be an appropriate choice, but it detects EM when training is already finished. In contrast, our monitor achieves near-onset detection at approximately the same marginal cost as final-only evaluation. Running behavior evaluation alone at every checkpoint would incur 7.7x the cost. Although our approach requires upfront calibration, this cost is amortized after approximately 14 monitored runs under our benchmark setting. Our monitor’s advantage grows with repeated use, making fine-grained safety monitoring practical at scale. We will expand section 5.1, the appendix to incorporate this analysis and reinforce the use case in the Introduction.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer CQMj (cont)

Q1/W1 - Held out EM types

We appreciate this suggestion and have conducted a new experiment on two qualitatively different distinct EM-inducing datasets that are different from the harmful-advice family in our original evaluation.

  • AestheticEM (Woodruff et al., 2025): finetuning on unpopular aesthetic preferences, without harmful advice or insecure code.
  • Norm-breaking: a new synthetic dataset constructed from Moral Stories and Social Chemistry 101, where assistants endorse everyday social-norm violations without providing harmful instructions or advice. Neither dataset was included in our original calibration. We use the same finetuning protocol (LoRA rank 16), across four models and four seeds.

Results. Both inducers exhibit drift aligned with our original geometric axis (median PC1 cosine ≈ 0.92), providing evidence of representational generalization. However, our frozen monitor (trained from the calibration data, as seen in the paper), exhibits opposite calibration mismatches: it overpredicts EM on AestheticEM (56.1% FPR) and underpredicts EM on norm-breaking (66.2% FNR). We therefore investigate a low-cost family-specific correction, adding just one labeled trajectory per model to calibration and evaluating on the remaining three held-out seeds:

Held-out inducer (RF)FNR: Frozen → Recal. (%)FPR: Frozen → Recal. (%)AUROC: Frozen → Recal.
AestheticEM0.0 → 11.956.1 → 11.40.931 → 0.961
Norm-breaking66.2 → 14.15.9 → 10.60.872 → 0.952

These findings (which will be presented in the new sub section in 5, reinforce that the underlying trait-space geometry generalizes beyond the original EM-inducer families, while the mapping to behavioral severity can require family-specific calibration. Importantly, substantial improvements require only one additional labeled trajectory per model, rather than reconstructing the representation or repeating the full calibration pipeline. We believe these experiments directly address the reviewer's request while providing a more precise characterization of the method's generalization capabilities and limitations.

Q2 - Motivation and further generalization

Recent work has shown that more capable LLMs can strategically alter their behavior in black-box evaluations [1,2,3], motivating greater interest in white-box monitoring. Existing activation-based methods have demonstrated promise for specific concepts (ex: refusal, deception [3,4]). Our work extends this direction by monitoring joint changes across multiple alignment dimensions, with new evidence from distinct EM types above.

We emphasize that we do not claim to detect all forms of misalignment. As this is still an active area of research, such universal coverage would be exceedingly demanding for any monitoring method. We view our method as primarily a contribution towards internal safety monitoring and invite future work to investigate additional representation and misalignment mechanisms.

We will reinforce these points to the related work and limitation sections.


[0] Anders Cairns Woodruff. 2025. Aesthetic preferences can cause emergent misalignment. https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gT3wtWBAs7PKonbmy/.LessWrong.

[1] Van Der Weij, Teun, et al. "Ai sandbagging: Language models can strategically underperform on evaluations." International Conference on Learning Representations. Vol. 2025. 2025.

[2] Greenblatt, Ryan, et al. "Alignment faking in large language models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.14093 2.1 (2024).

[3] Parrack, Avi, Carlo Leonardo Attubato, and Stefan Heimersheim. "Benchmarking deception probes via black-to-white performance boosts." arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.12691 (2025).

[4] Goldowsky-Dill, Nicholas, et al. "Detecting strategic deception with linear probes." Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning. 2025.

Thanks for the replies. I do not think all of my questions are answered totaly but I increased the score to weak acceptance.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Final response to Reviewer CQMj

Thank you for your follow-up and for reconsidering your assessment. We appreciate your constructive feedback, which helped us strengthen the paper.

We have incorporated our responses to the revision.

Thank you again for your time and thoughtful consideration.

Best, The Authors

Reviewer_sbPbOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

The paper is proposing to monitor emergent misalignment during fine-tuning from internal activations. It proceeds by extracting seven traits (i.e., honesty, helpfulness, harmlessness, power-seeking, corrigibility, sycophancy, and confidence), through the use of contrastive prompts. The final-token activation projected in those seven dimensions is then used to track drift during fine-tuning. Experimental results over some problems show a good capacity to identify cases where misalignment is identified.

Critical strengths

The idea of identifying when a network leaves a relatively benign state in a more complex situation during fine-tuning is interesting and may be used as a trigger for a deeper evaluation of the possible misalignment that is ongoing.

It is maybe not a “critical” element, but I want to mention that the experiments are quite thorough and provide honest boundaries on the reach of the work.

Critical weaknesses

The drifts toward misalignment are induced mostly within-category. None of the 12 evil_numbers held-out runs becomes dangerous, so all 217 dangerous held-out checkpoints come from risky_financial_advice and subtle_misinformation, which App. 4.4 groups with the calibration set bad_medical_advice as "harmful advice". Fig. 9 shows that for Qwen and Gemma, bad_medical_advice is the only calibration dataset with any dangerous checkpoints (LLaMA has only 3 dangerous checkpoints outside it, per Table 15). For three of four models, Table 1 is therefore close to an in-category test, and as such, the 1.8% FNR should be read accordingly.

Also, the role of the seven alignment traits is less clear than the paper suggests. App. 3 shows held-out FNR stays at 1.84% for every K from 7 down to 2, and is 2.76% at K = 1. Trait importance is inconsistent across models (median pairwise Spearman 0.04), and the long-horizon alarm uses only the magnitude of PC1 (App. 9). I feel that other traits or even variables with no clear meaning can be as effective, if not more.

Questions for authors
  1. What are the measured costs (GPU time per checkpoint for monitoring vs behavioural evaluation, and total calibration cost)?
  2. Do the Persona baseline and the 7D monitor use the same evaluation prompts?
  3. Would other traits out of the 7 one proposed be effective with this proposal? Can you think of either exploring other concepted relevant to alignment, or just go with variables not having clear conceptual meaning as possible variables to guide the monitoring during fine-tuning.
3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer sbPb

We thank the reviewer for the constructive feedback and for recognizing the experimental thoroughness and honest characterization of our contributions. In the following response, we first present new experiments on two distinct held-out EM-inducing datasets to further characterize the generalizability of our approach. We then clarify the role and necessity of our alignment-relevant trait basis, provide additional quantitative analysis of monitoring and calibration cost. Finally, we show that our 7D monitor substantially outperforms Persona Vectors under matched conditions.

W1 - Cross category generalization

To investigate broader generalization, we introduce two qualitative different EM-inducing datasets. AestheticEM (Woodruff et al., 2025), which finetunes on unpopular aesthetic preferences, and Norm-breaking, our own new synthetic dataset in which AI assistants casually endorse everyday social-norm violations. Neither involves harmful advice or insecure code seen in the calibration data. We evaluate both across the four stated LLMs and 4 seeds using the original finetuning protocol.

Generalization and calibration mismatched. Both datasets exhibit strong alignment with the original drift geometry (median P1 cosine ~0.92). On AestheticEM, substantial representational drift produces relatively little behavioral EM, causing the monitor to overpredict danger (56.1% FPR). Conversely, norm-breaking induces more behavioral EM relative to its drift profile, causing the monitor to underpredict (66.2% FNR). These results suggest that the underlying representational geometry transfers more readily than the calibrated mapping from drift to behavioral severity.

A cheap, family-specific correction. We therefore test whether adding just one labeled finetuning trajectory per model from the new family to the original calibration data can correct this mismatch. Using one seed for recalibration and three held-out seeds for evaluation, we observe significant mitigation of the over/under-predictio (see below). The correction substantially reduces the dominant error in both families without re-extracting the trait directions or repeating the full calibration pipeline. We will include these experiments in the revised section 5.2 of the manuscript to establish a more precise generalization boundary, consistent with our effort to provide clear technical insights for adopters.

Held-out inducer (RF)FNR: Frozen → Recal. (%)FPR: Frozen → Recal. (%)AUROC: Frozen → Recal.
AestheticEM0.0 → 11.956.1 → 11.40.931 → 0.961
Norm-breaking66.2 → 14.15.9 → 10.60.872 → 0.952
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer sbPb (cont)

Q2 - Persona vector evaluation Our original comparison follows Chen et al’s published protocol, using their 20 evaluation prompts rather than our 115 neutral prompts. To address the reviewer’s concern, we perform an additional comparison using identical evaluation prompts, with matched conditions on the rest, while retaining Chen et al.’s extracted evil-persona direction. The prompt-matched comparison reaffirms that our 7D monitor substantially outperforms the Persona baseline: only 4 false negatives and 5 false positives, versus 39 and 43 for the matched Persona RF. Thus, the performance advantage cannot be explained by the difference in evaluation prompts.

MethodFNR (%)FPR (%)AUROC
Persona (original protocol, Ridge)3.725.50.939
Persona (matched prompts, RF)18.017.10.875
Our 7D monitor (RF)1.82.00.989

W2/Q3 - Alternative alignment traits and arbitrary feature directions. We appreciate this suggestion. In fact, section 4.3.1 already investigates whether alignment-relevant directions provide useful information beyond arbitrary features. We compare our seven alignment traits against equally sized bases comprising seven non-alignment semantic concepts (e.g., verbosity, formality, humor) and seven random directions. Under RF, their FNRs are substantially higher (36.9% and 43.9%, respectively, versus 1.8% for ours). This finding provides direct empirical evidence that alignment relevance matters, rather than merely the number of dimensions. We agree, however, that our selected seven traits are not necessarily optimal. As discussed in section 4.3.4, smaller subsets can retain predictive performance, with trait importance varying across architectures. Exploring other alignment-relevant directions and alternative trait combinations remains a valuable direction for future work, which we will reinforce in section 6.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Follow up to response

Dear Reviewer sbPb, As the rebuttal period is nearing its end, we would like to inquire whether any concerns remain that we could clarify. We have incorporated the new experiments and analyses into the revised PDF and would welcome your reassessment of the paper in light of these additions.

We sincerely appreciate your constructive critique and encouraging assessment of the work.

Best, Authors

Reviewer_fWZ5OpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
1
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Paper summary

The author is the paper provides an activation-based trait-space monitoring protocol to detect emergent misalignment (EM) where models finetuned on insecure code completions or harmful medical advice will also recommend dangerous actions on unrelated conversational prompts. The monitoring protocol has two phases: i) extraction: they define seven trait measurement axis relevant to LLM alignment such as honesty, helpfulness, harmlessness, power-seeking, corrigibility, sycophancy and confidence. Each direction is the normalized difference between the mean activations under 5 positive and 5 negative system prompts, each paired with 30 questions. ii) measurement: At every checkpoint (every 10 training steps), the authors give 115 neutral prompts to the model, average the hidden state of the last input token, and project this average on the seven directions. The change from step 0, divided by the norm of the base activation, is a seven-dimensional "drift vector". On 48 calibration runs (4 models, 4 datasets, 3 seeds), the first principal component (PC1) of the final drift vectors explains 78.6% of the variance. The authors say this direction is stable when one dataset is left out, when the LoRA rank changes from 4 to 128, and under full finetuning. They add controls for the correlation among the seven trait directions. A per-model random forest (RF), gradient boosting (GBR) or ridge regressor maps the drift vector to the EM rate measured with the GPT-4o judge of Betley et al. On 468 checkpoints from 36 runs on three held-out datasets, the RF has 1.8% false negative rate (FNR), 2.0% false positive rate (FPR) and 0.989 AUROC at a 6% EM threshold. It gives better results than the baselines: scalar PC1, an evil persona vector, activation norm, training loss, LoRA norms, PCA, PLS and a small sparse autoencoder (SAE).

Critical strengths
  • The paper addresses a clear problem in LLM safety training. Behavior tests at every checkpoint are costly, so a cheap checkpoint-level monitor for emergent misalignment (EM) is useful.
  • The experiments are broad. They use 4 models, 3 seeds, held-out datasets, a second judge, and a matched benign/dangerous control to test EM detection in trait-space drift.
  • The paper compares the 7D trait-space system with many baselines (scalar PC1, persona vector, activation norm, training loss, PCA-7, PLS-7, SAE, LoRA norm). This shows clearly where the 7D method is better.
Critical weaknesses
  • The reason for the seven traits is unclear. The paper picks honesty, helpfulness, harmlessness, power-seeking, corrigibility, sycophancy and confidence from prior work. It does not explain why these seven should change under EM, or why they make a good coordinate system.
  • The early warning claim is weak. The introduction says the monitor gives an alarm “at or before the behavioral crossover in 20 of 24 dangerous runs”.
  • The prompt design has no clear reason. The paper cites prior work for the contrastive method. But it gives no reason for 5 positive and 5 negative prompts, or for 30 questions per prompt. The results depend on this choice.
  • The calibration datasets are insecure_code, jailbroken, bad_medical_advice and GSM8K. The held-out datasets are evil_numbers, risky_financial_advice and subtle_misinformation. Two of the three held-out datasets are in the same harmful-advice family as bad_medical_advice. The third, evil_numbers, does not cause EM in any of the four models.
Questions for authors
  • Why do you use only these seven traits? What is the benefit of using seven?
  • Can you swap the setup? Use evil_numbers, risky_financial_advice, subtle_misinformation and one more dataset for calibration, and test on the others. Appendix 4.3 suggests this will be hard, so please report the full result.
  • How many dangerous calibration runs and checkpoints does each model have?
1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer fWZ5

We thank the reviewer for the positive appraisal of our paper, especially on our empirical rigor on an important safety problem. We respond to the Weakness (W) and Questions (Q) items below.

W1/Q1- Choice of seven traits.

Our choice is initially motivated by the EM literature: narrow finetuning induces broader behavioral changes, suggesting that its representational effect may appear along alignment-relevant dimensions. Informed by literature, we select the 7 traits that could more plausibly capture these changes (especially the helpfulness, honesty, and harmlessness triad). Our hypothesis is that, together, their joint representation would provide a useful space in which to characterize EM-relevant changes.

More importantly, this choice is empirically supported. In section 4.3.1, replacing the seven alignment directions with seven non-alignment semantic directions or random directions increases RF false-negative rates from 1.8% to 36.9% and 43.9%, respectively.

We also clarify, however, that the selected 7 traits may not be universally optimal. Our ablations show that smaller subsets can retain comparable predictive performance, although the most informative traits vary across architectures. Exploring additional alignment-relevant directions and more optimal trait subsets remains an important direction for future work. We will clarify the selection process in Section 3.1.

W2 - Early warning.

We agree that our monitoring system functions primarily as an efficient canary to trigger behavior evaluation rather than an early warning system. We will further reinforce the practical applicability of technique in section 6 and reinforce the phrasing to clarify this point in the Intro and section 5.1.

W3 - Prompt design.

Our contrastive extraction protocol builds directly on established representation-engineering and activation-steering methods (Zou et al., 2023; Turner et al., 2024; Rimsky et al., 2024). We use the 5 positive/negative pairs to reduce dependence on individual prompt wording, each paired with 30 diverse questions to average over conversational contexts.

Furthermore, we explicitly evaluate sensitivity to these design choices in Appendix 1.2. Subsampling the polarity prompts from 5+5 to 3+3 across 20 random draws, as well as independently paraphrasing the extraction prompts, preserves strong alignment of the resulting geometry with the original (PC1 cosine ≥ 0.9). Thus, our extraction method follows established protocol and our geometric findings are robust to prompt variations.

W4/Q2 Cross-category generalization and calibration/test swap.

We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. We reverse the split by using the original held-out datasets (plus extreme_sports) for calibration and the rest for testing while keeping the same protocol. The swapped monitor retains nearly identical discrimination (AUROC 0.988 vs. 0.989) and low FPR, although FNR increases. Importantly, on the non-advice test datasets, it detects 27/28 dangerous insecure-code checkpoints (3.6% FNR, 4.7% FPR) and 36/38 dangerous jailbreak checkpoints (5.3% FNR, 2.5% FPR). Combined, these yield 4.5% FNR and 3.7% FPR, providing direct evidence of cross-category transfer. Full results and confidence intervals appear in revised the Appendix.

Split (RF)FNR (%)FPR (%)AUROC
Original1.82.00.989
Swapped8.42.20.988
Swapped, without extreme_sports9.02.60.983

Q3 - Checkpoints count

We report the counts below (Betley EM > 6%; 4 calibration datasets × 3 seeds = 12 runs and 156 checkpoints per model).

ModelDangerous runs (of 12)Dangerous checkpoints (of 156)From bad_medical_advice
LLaMA6303 runs / 27 ckpts
Mistral11993 runs / 34 ckpts
Qwen383 runs / 8 ckpts
Gemma3303 runs / 30 ckpts

Dangerous calibration coverage is uneven across models. For Qwen and Gemma, all dangerous checkpoints come from bad_medical_advice, and Qwen has only 8. In the swapped setup (W4/Q2), the dangerous calibration checkpoints rise to 78, 102, 41 and 92 of 156 for LLaMA, Mistral, Qwen and Gemma, respectively. Even so, the swapped monitor detects EM from insecure code and jailbreak data that it was not calibrated on. We will add this table to the Appendix and reference it in Section 4.2.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Summary of Revisions for the Chairs

Dear reviewers and chairs,

We would like to thank the reviewers for their constructive feedback and recognition of our paper's strengths: fWZ5 highlights our method's practical relevance in AI safety and empirical rigor; sbPb praises its empirical thoroughness and honest characterization of practical boundaries; CQMj also recognizes our novelty and clarity.

We have addressed the reviewer's major concerns with additional experiments and clarification:

  • Reviewer fWZ5 (Methodology and generalization): We clarify the design choice for our trait selection, prompt construction, reinforce the monitor's primary use case as near-onset screening, report dangerous calibration counts, and conduct the requested reverse calibration/test split, which further showcases the robustness of our method.
  • Review sbPb (Generalization and baselines): We test 2 additional EM-inducing datasets across the 4 LLMs, demonstrated improvements through an efficient recalibration method, and clarify the role of alignment-informed traits (already dedicated in section 4.3.2), and conduct the requested prompt-matched Persona Vector comparison, which also confirms our method's superior results.
  • Review CQMj (Practical utility and scope): We include the requested cost-detection analysis, showing over 7x lower marginal cost than equally frequent behavior evaluation. We also expanded the generalization experiments as described.

The revision incorporates these new experiments, methodological clarifications. More importantly, we also add a section to synthesize our empirical findings into practical deployment suggestions for practitioners. We hope these additions help inform the final assessment.

Best, Authors

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