- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
the paper studies how an agent's previous interactions change its safety on subsequent tasks compared with evaluating each task from an empty context. The key finding is that prior unsafe compliance can make agents less safe; ordinary task histories often preserve safety; histories containing harmful requests and refusals frequently increase caution and over-refusal. Benchmarks used: AgentDojo, AgentHarm, RedCode. A variety of models:
- Open-weight: DeepSeek V4 Pro, DeepSeek V4 Flash, Kimi K2.6, Kimi K3, Muse Glimmer.
- Closed-weight: GPT 5.6 Sol, Claude Sonnet 5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Gemini 3.7 Flash.
Critical strengths
- interesting problem to study
- experiments across different models and context settings provide evidence supporting the paper's thesis
Critical weaknesses
i'm not sure what the key novelty is here. The finding that models become more likely to comply with harmful requests after seeing examples of unsafe compliance is already known from many-shot jailbreaking.
Questions for authors
what validates the actual main-experiment judge and do corrected empty-message checks change the conclusions?
We sincerely thank the reviewer for their appreciation of our work!
On the novelty and many-shot jailbreaking (W1).
Our key contribution, as outlined in the introduction, is a general framework for systematically evaluating how the type and depth of context influence safety measurements for frontier agentic models. By convincingly showing how a safety score depends on what precedes the evaluated task, we argue that future benchmarks should cover a range of context distributions rather than the empty one alone.
Regarding many-shot jailbreaking, we already discuss this and its subsequent works in the paper (Sec. 4). Our work demonstrates that this phenomenon (i) generalizes to frontier agents, (ii) across a broader range of environments, when conditioned on contexts that contain compliant behavior. Furthermore, we use only a few prior compliance demonstrations (multi-shot) and show they even transfer between agents.
Increased compliance after unsafe demonstrations is only one of our findings listed in the introduction:
Clearly, most safety benchmarks do not evaluate agents in context, which provides direct evidence that our findings about their substantial measurement changes are valuable. What might seem “already known” in hindsight is not a settled debate in the safety field.
Regarding the judge:
Regarding the empty-message checks:
We now state this in Appendix E (lines 1864–1866).
Thank you again for finding our paper clear, informative, and sound. We would greatly appreciate an increase in rating if you feel we adequately addressed your remaining concerns.