- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper addresses the sleeper agent supply chain risk faced by organizations that lack access to U.S. frontier models and must rely on open-weight models, whose provenance cannot be verified, for agentic cyber-defense. The authors propose Moonshine, a protocol for distillation in which neither the teacher model nor the distillation actor needs to be trusted. Moonshine decomposes distillation into four stages, runs teacher inference and student training inside Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), and links the stages through hashes, signatures and an append-only log, so that downstream users can verify the student’s lineage without re-running training. It further restricts distillation to hard sequence distillation or on policy distillation and keeps teacher logits inside the TEE, which closes the logit channel used to smuggle backdoors.
Critical strengths
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As open-weight models are increasingly adopted in security-critical settings, obtaining a verifiable, backdoor-free student from an untrusted teacher is an important and timely problem.
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The paper is clearly written; the threat model, the protocol figure and the end-to-end example in the appendix make the protocol easy to follow.
Critical weaknesses
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The protocol requires a randomly initialized student or one from a different model family, but the former amounts to pretraining from scratch, and by the paper’s own account the provenance of the latter cannot be verified either.
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The paper assumes that TEE attestation and isolation cannot be broken and does not consider adaptive attacks against the TEE itself, such as side-channel attacks.
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The protocol relies on public scrutiny of the transfer corpus, but the paper provides no auditing procedure and does not evaluate whether poisoned samples can be detected.
Questions for authors
Please see the Weaknesses section.
2 comments
author response
we thank the reviewer for their careful review of our manuscript!
we believe that we addressed W1 and W3 in you review in previous responses (in particular, we address the scope of trust in the student model in the W3 section of our response to vKru, and the question of audibility of the transfer corpus in the W1.2 section of our response to vKru)
further, we believe that we designated attacks on the TEE itself as out of scope in L133-138 in the paper, but we can improve the clarity here in the final manuscript.
The author did not answer my question, so I have chosen to keep my rating as it is; I hope the author will take my question seriously.