- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This study proposes a fast adversarial attack that predicts input gradients with a linear regressor instead of computing them through backpropagation. The approach is particularly fast when many perturbations must be generated. The experiments show that applying the proposed method to attacks such as FGSM and PGD increases the number of successful attacks per second. Under assumptions about the stochastic properties of the model’s hidden states and input gradients, the authors also show that the mean of the input gradient can be represented by an affine predictor.
Critical strengths
The proposed method offers an interesting approach to accelerating perturbation generation. As noted below, training the additional linear regressor takes time, but this cost may be amortized when generating a large number of perturbations.
Critical weaknesses
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The attack success rate drops substantially. Methods using predicted gradients are much less successful than those using exact gradients. For example, in the Qwen 2.5 PGD-10 setting, the attack success rate falls from 72.1% with exact gradient computation to 18.7% with gradient prediction. This is a major weakness even when the increase in throughput is taken into account.
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Tables 1 and 2 should include the time required to train the linear regressors. The authors should clarify how many perturbations must be generated in each setting to amortize the training cost. Table 4 reports results related to this question, but it covers only FGM, which is insufficient. This is an important consideration for the proposed method and requires more detailed reporting.
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FGSM and PGD are no longer sufficient for robust evaluations. Such evaluations typically use stronger, more recent adaptive attacks, such as AutoAttack [1]. At least, the authors should include a stronger modern gradient-based attack, such as APGD [1], in their evaluation.
[1] F. Croce et al. Reliable evaluation of adversarial robustness with an ensemble of diverse parameter-free attacks. ICML20. -
The assumptions in Proposition 1 limit its applicability. The proposition assumes that the means and variances of the final hidden state H(x) and input gradient G(x) do not depend on x, which generally does not hold. Although the authors provide a lemma to justify these assumptions, that justification places strong restrictions on the inputs and their embeddings. The proposition’s scope therefore remains limited.
Questions for authors
Weakness 1 is my primary concern. I would appreciate a clearer explanation of how the reported gains in throughput might justify the substantial reduction in attack success rate.