- Rating
- 4
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper studies the suppression of specific IP characters in text-to-image models, focusing on cases where prompts induce character generation through appearance descriptions without explicitly naming the character. The method uses the model’s velocity prediction to estimate the predicted clean output, and monitors the emerging character identity through similarity to a reference images. When the similarity exceeds a threshold, the method computes the difference between predictions conditioned on the target character and its generic category at the current generation state, then subtracts the positive projection along this difference direction from the original prediction. The generic-category anchor aims to suppress character identity while preserving the subject category.
The authors evaluate the method on FLUX.1-dev and SD 3.5 Medium under both direct and indirect prompting. Results show lower mean target-character detection rates than the compared baselines across all four settings, while generic-characteristic consistency remains close to that of the original models. Additional composition experiments suggest that the method can complement mitigation strategies applied at other stages, although it substantially increases inference cost.
Critical strengths
S1. The problem is clearly formulated and practically relevant to indirect prompting in settings where prompts cannot be modified. Define risk in terms of the generated output and its evolving state, rather than restricting it to whether the prompt contains a character name is well motivated.
S2. The generic-category anchor is well motivated and supported by an ablation study. Comparing the null-condition anchor with the generic-category anchor provides stronger evidence than reporting the effectiveness of the full method alone and supports the rationale that preserving category-level semantics helps reduce the side effects of intervention.
S3. The paper is relatively comprehensive, with supplementary analyses of composability, computational cost, and evaluator reliability. These analyses strengthen the paper and help readers assess the method’s practical limitations.
Critical weaknesses
W1. The method assumes that the target character is known in advance: for each generation, the system already knows that “Olaf is the character to suppress.” However, a key challenge of indirect prompting is that the system does not know which character the user is attempting to elicit. In reality, is the method provided with a single target character in advance for each test case? Under indirect prompting, is this target supplied by the evaluation labels or identified automatically by the system? Extending the method from a single specified character to a set of protected characters, without knowing which character each query targets, would substantially improve its practical utility.
W2. Indirect prompts consist of a character’s distinctive attributes, such as “a carrot nose and twig arms.” Yet these are precisely the attributes encoded by . Removing the component along this direction necessarily weakens content explicitly requested by the user. The paper does not define what an “ideal output” should look like under indirect prompting: which attributes must be preserved to remain faithful to the prompt, and which can be removed to eliminate character identity. The method may therefore reduce the recognizability of protected characters by sacrificing some of the user’s requested content.
W3. The default intervention strength introduces reverse guidance beyond orthogonal projection removal. When , the corrected component along the target direction is . Thus, the default 1.5 not only removes the positive projection but also introduces a component in the opposite direction. This operation is consistent with the optimization constraint in Eq. 7, but should be clearly distinguished from exact projection removal (). Although Table 6 reports an ablation on intervention strength, the paper could further discuss how this additional reverse guidance affects specific attributes requested in the prompt and assess the extent to which stronger suppression comes at the cost of greater semantic drift.
Questions for authors
Please address the points that directly correspond to the concerns raised in the Weaknesses section. No new experiments are required.
4 comments
Response to Reviewer 5gFK (2)
W3: Projection strength 1.5 introduces reverse guidance.
Yes. The reverse component is intentional: it provides stronger suppression than removing the aligned component alone. To limit inference overhead and unnecessary semantic changes, we intervene only at selected steps, while the original user prompt continues to drive generation toward the target throughout denoising. A moderate reverse correction at these selected steps therefore helps counter the continuing generation bias.
As you note, the strength ablation supports as a balance between suppression and characteristic consistency (Fig. 7; Table 8, Appendix B.5). It improves suppression over across both models and prompt types with only small CONS decreases, whereas increasing to 2.0 offers less consistent benefits. We have also revised the intervention-strength discussion in the manuscript (Sec. 4.2) to clarify the rationale for the reverse correction and our choice of .
I thank the authors for their detailed response, which has clarified all my questions. Although the issue I raised remains, I find the paper sufficiently persuasive given its stated research objectives. I will therefore keep my original rating of 4.
Thank you for your positive feedback. We appreciate your recognition of the paper’s contribution. We also appreciate your constructive comments, which have helped us clarify the scope and limitations of our work.
Response to Reviewer 5gFK (1)
We sincerely thank the reviewer for the time and care devoted to reviewing our work. We appreciate the reviewer's recognition of the generation-state-based formulation of risk for indirect prompts, the ablation evidence for generic-category anchors, and the comprehensive experimental analyses. Below, we address the reviewer's comments individually.
Thank you for the insightful comment. Yes. In our main experiments, following prior works [1, 2], each test case is assigned a single target IP by the evaluation setup, including under Indirect prompting; the system does not automatically identify the target in these experiments. We agree that removing this per-query target prior improves practical utility, and have therefore implemented and evaluated a small-scale multi-IP extension. This extension largely retains single-target suppression and CONS with little additional inference cost, without requiring per-query target specification.
In the multi-IP setting, the deploying platform or rights holder specifies the protected set in advance, and we prepare a reference bank and generic-category anchor for each IP offline. The system does not need to know which protected IP a query targets. Instead, the monitor compares the predicted clean output with all reference banks and applies the projection for the highest-scoring IP above threshold.
To validate this capability, we compare single-target and multi-IP mitigation on FLUX.1 with nested sets of 3, 5, and 10 randomly selected protected IPs, using matched prompts and three seeds for each IP (Table 11, Appendix B.10). Arrows denote single-target to multi-IP results, and DETECT is reported as detected images / total images. Multi-IP mitigation maintains CONS close to single-target values, with unchanged DETECT except for the 10-IP Indirect case (5/30 to 7/30).
We also report inference time and the fraction of applied interventions directed at another protected IP (non-target updates) in Table 12. Multi-IP mitigation adds only 0.10–0.41 s/img. Although some updates are directed at other protected IPs, suppression and CONS remain close to single-target results in these tests.
[1] He, L., et al. "Fantastic Copyrighted Beasts and How (Not) to Generate Them." ICLR, 2025.
[2] Han, N., et al. "GrOCE: Graph-Guided Online Concept Erasure for Text-to-Image Diffusion Models." CVPR, 2026.
Thank you for raising another insightful question. Yes, the target IP versus generic category contrast can include semantics that overlap with explicitly requested appearance attributes. The ideal output is a generic subject that retains the requested content without being recognizable as the target IP. Given the difficulty existing methods face in suppressing Indirect IP generation, our design prioritizes suppression when it conflicts with prompt adherence, while using the generic category as a preservation reference and retaining as much requested content as possible.
We would also like to clarify that using a generic-category anchor does not mean reducing every output to generic-category content and erasing all user-specified attributes. The original user prompt continues to condition denoising, allowing requested details beyond the generic category to remain. We do not prescribe that attributes such as a carrot nose or twig arms must be removed. In Fig. 6, the snowman generated from the Olaf-related prompt retains both, illustrating the desired balance between suppressing target identity and preserving requested attributes. Fig. 10 similarly shows a generic fish retaining the requested line-art rendering, and the semantic and human evaluations provide further evidence of content retention (Tables 15–16, Appendix B.11).
Nevertheless, the boundary between shared attributes and recognizable target identity can be subtle: faithfully reproducing every requested attribute may itself recreate the protected IP. Fine-grained control over this boundary remains an open challenge. We hope this work motivates more precise mitigation strategies that preserve more indirect attributes without recreating the target IP, allowing service providers to choose the degree of suppression according to their platform policies.