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Paper summary
This paper focuses on the problem of controlling access to sensitive capabilities in open-weight LLMs. The authors propose Tiered Language Models (TLMs), which use secret parameter permutations to enable different capability tiers within a single set of model weights. A two-stage training protocol is developed to separate public and private capabilities. Experiments on 180M- and 650M-parameter models evaluate capability separation, computational efficiency, adversarial robustness, and hierarchical capability tiers.
Critical strengths
- The paper tackles an important challenge in open-weight LLM deployment: enabling broad access to model weights while restricting certain sensitive capabilities. This paper provide a conceptually appealing approach in which a single set of model weights supports different capability configurations through compact permutation keys. The framework does not require additional learned parameters for each capability tier.
- The experiments cover language acquisition, instruction following, and factual memorization, providing evidence that the proposed mechanism can separate different types of learned behavior. The extension to hierarchical capability tiers further demonstrates the flexibility of the framework.
Critical weaknesses
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Limited technical novelty. Parameter-level access control for neural networks has been explored in prior work [1], and permutation-based model reconfiguration is not entirely new. While the proposed asymmetric training strategy is interesting, its technical distinction from existing approaches could be better clarified. Moreover, its effectiveness is not sufficiently validated due to the lack of comparison with symmetric joint pretraining.
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Insufficient evaluation against adaptive white-box attacks. The evaluated attacks are relatively limited and do not adequately reflect realistic adversaries with full access to the model weights. In particular, the partial-key experiments only consider randomly selected subsets of the correct key, without investigating whether an adversary could actively search for alternative parameter configurations that recover the restricted capabilities.
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Limited generalizability and scalability. The experiments focus on relatively small models (180M and 650M) and use simplified tasks as proxies for sensitive capabilities. It remains unclear whether the proposed method can effectively protect complex, generalizable capabilities in larger LLMs.
[1] CoreLocker: Neuron-level Usage Control, S&P 2024
Questions for authors
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What is the fundamental technical novelty of the proposed training protocol? Could the authors clarify the main methodological innovation and explain how it differs from existing approaches?
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Is asymmetric joint pretraining necessary for capability separation? Could the authors provide an ablation comparing the proposed asymmetric gradient updates against symmetric joint pretraining
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Can the authors evaluate capability extraction on more generalizable tasks? The current fine-tuning-based extraction experiment relies on synthetic biographies with independently generated facts. Would the proposed mechanism remain robust when attackers attempt to recover instruction-following abilities or knowledge learned from more structured datasets?
2 comments
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Dear Reviewer,
We wanted to briefly follow up on our response and thank you again for the review. We ran new experiments for the weaknesses you raised. We have added an adaptive attack, experimented with symmetric joint pretraining, and showed capability extraction on more generalizable capabilities. We have also provided a note distinguishing our work from previous approaches.
We hope that our results and clarifications have helped address your concerns.
Rebuttal
We thank you for your effort in reviewing our paper. We are happy that you believe we are tackling an important problem with a conceptually appealing approach and extensive experiments. Below, we address the specific concerns:
W1(a)/Q1 "Limited technical novelty"
We thank the reviewer for the reference and we now cite [1] in section 2. Our contribution is a training protocol that yields two capable configurations over the same weights, with private capabilities added after public-only pretraining and kept out of the public configuration. We provide more context on differentiation from prior works below.
Difference from [1]. CoreLocker zeroes out a small set of high-impact weights in a trained network and gives their values to authorized users as the key. TLMs differ in three ways. (i) [1] withholds learned values, so the key is part of the model. A TLM releases every weight, and the key only specifies an arrangement. (ii) Without the key, [1] degrades the whole model, down to chance. A TLM's public configuration is a fully capable LLM, and the key only adds specific capabilities. (iii) [1] works post hoc because breaking the model is its goal. TLMs need two working configurations of the same weights, which joint pretraining provides and post-hoc permutation cannot (Appendix D.1).
Permutation-based reconfiguration. TrojanNet (Guo et al., 2020, discussed in Section 2) hides a secret network by permuting each layer's parameters and training both tasks jointly. However, its goal is covertness and it cannot be used for selective capability separation. TLMs instead apply permutation of weights for access-control of capabilities. We introduce non-trivial components such as asymmetric joint pretraining, and KL-anchored fine-tuning for a nested tiered access-control system.
Gradient routing and weight update. Gradient Routing (Cloud et al., 2024) and SGTM (Shilov et al., 2025) partition updates by data. Our rule partitions by computation graph: the same public data flows through two arrangements of the weights, and S receives gradients only through the permuted one.
W1(b)/Q2 "Effectiveness of asymmetric joint pretraining"
We have added a new experiment to compare asymmetric vs symmetric joint pretraining. Our results show that symmetric joint pretraining results in around 25% more leakage compared to our proposed asymmetric approach.
[Revision: See Figure 10 in Appendix D.2]
W2 “Insufficient evaluation against adaptive white-box attacks”
We have now added an adaptive key search attack. We make it deliberately favorable to the attacker. The attacker knows exactly which weights form S, so only the swaps are unknown. It scores each candidate key by the NLL of the ground-truth private bios. Starting from a random pairing, it applies random changes and keeps those that lower the NLL, over about 85K candidate keys (corresponding to about 16 hrs on a single H100 GPU). We observe that while the NLL falls significantly, it stays far above that of CK. The keys it finds share almost none of the true swaps, and exact-match recall stays near 1%.
[Revision: See Figure 6 and L477-L487 in Section 6]
W3 “Limited generalizability and scalability.”
We agree that we do not evaluate protection of hazardous capabilities at frontier scale. We would like to highlight that we are functioning on an academic budget and that our goal is to illustrate the access-control utility of the proposed approach (i.e., separating capabilities within the same model), which we show over multiple types of proxy tasks. Note that the training procedure is the same for any private dataset.
To match the claims to the evidence presented, we are willing to amend the title of the paper (for example, "Tiered Language Models: Separating Public and Private Capabilities in Open-Weight LLMs"), and mark the Figure 1 dialogue as illustrative.
On scalability, the trend we observed is favorable. Across five scales from 42M to 650M, the public-domain perplexity gap between a TLM and a matched non-TLM model shrinks steadily, falling below 1% at 650M (see Figure 4).
Q3 "capability extraction on more generalizable tasks?"
First, on the independence of the biographies: since the held-out facts are independent of the attacker’s data, any recovery must come from knowledge hidden in the model. Our new password-locked baseline recovers 35% of them under the same attack, while the TLM stays near 0%.
[Revision: See Figure 5 left and Section 6]
Second, we repeated the attack on a generalizable capability, Spanish language modeling, at 650M. We find the same trend: there is no faster recovery of Spanish capabilities for C_pub compared to only-pretrained baseline or TLM trained for another capability (Portuguese).
[Revision: See Figure 13 and Appendix D.6]
We did not run this attack on instruction following or on structured knowledge such as WMDP within the discussion period. We plan to add these to the final version.