- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
PowerMarketJax implements five electricity-market environments and independent PPO/SAC learners in JAX. The suite combines bidding, market clearing, settlement, and policy updates on the GPU. The authors validate clearing against reference implementations and an independent solver, measure runtime, and examine coordinated markups, crowded battery arbitrage, and manipulation of flexibility demand.
Critical strengths
-
Moving constrained market clearing into the same execution pipeline as learning addresses a real bottleneck. The released suite covers markets with different settlement rules and includes detailed configurations. Its engineering contribution is supported by reference checks across all five markets, price comparisons with HiGHS, and a measured end-to-end training speedup in the balancing market. Together, these make a credible case that the suite can lower the cost of studying strategic behavior in electricity markets.
-
The analysis goes beyond reporting agent returns. In the flexibility market, disabling the contribution of strategic charging to the procurement baseline largely removes the excess profit. That intervention helps explain what the agents have learned and illustrates how the suite could reveal unintended incentives in a market design.
Critical weaknesses
-
[Major] Strategic fidelity remains uncertain for the day-ahead commitment approximation. This market rounds a relaxed commitment solution before solving dispatch. Appendix D.4 reports modest production-cost gaps against exact commitment across three networks under truthful bids, which is useful evidence. However, strategic bids can change both commitment and the marginal generator, and a small cost gap does not establish that profitable deviations are preserved. I would like a targeted check of learned bids against exact commitment, followed by dispatch and settlement under the stated pricing rule, comparing feasibility and individual profits. This limits confidence in the day-ahead strategic conclusions, although it does not invalidate the other market environments or the demonstrated computational benefit.
-
[Minor] The interpretation of coordinated profit gains needs a clearer connection to the learning objective. In the day-ahead experiment, the learned outcome resists the tested unilateral deviations, yet a more profitable joint markup is presented as something independent learners miss. These agents optimize their own profits; a coordinated increase in producer profit is not automatically a better solution to that game. The observed difference between joint and unilateral incentives is informative, but should not itself be treated as a failure of learning. Separating these criteria would correct the interpretation without changing the experimental result.
Questions for authors
See weaknesses.
4 comments
Dear Reviewer fkEa,
Thank you again for your time in reviewing our work. We’d like to check if our rebuttal has clarified your concerns. If there are still any unclear parts in our work, please let us know and we would be happy to engage further before the discussion period closes.
Thanks for your reply. I will maintain my positive score.
Dear Reviewer fkEa,
Thank you for your positive feedback and support. We sincerely appreciate your time and constructive comments.
Best regards, All authors
W1 Response:
Thank you for this comment. We agree that the relaxed commitment may change the results. To test this, we add new experiments in Appendix E.2. We take the strategic bids learned from IPPO-PS and IPPO-NoPS on case29gb (all 10 training seeds × 36 evaluation days), and clear them with our relaxed method and the mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) solved by HiGHS.
For each bid profile, both methods use the same strategic bids and market clearing rules. Commitment, dispatch, prices, and profits are recomputed separately for each method. Detailed results are provided in Appendix E.2, with the key findings summarized below.
In summary, the gaps between the relaxed method and the MILP are acceptable, because it does not affect feasibility, changes prices only slightly, and leaves the profit ranking almost unchanged. This means the qualitative results and our conclusions are kept the same.
Following your comment we have:
Reference: Morales-España et al. "Tight and compact MILP formulation for the thermal unit commitment problem." IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 2013. Gómez et al. "Relax-and-round strategies for solving the unit commitment problem with AC power flow constraints." Optim. Eng., 2026. FERC. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.: Order on Paper Hearing. Docket No. EL18-34-000, 2019.
W2 Response:
We agree, and we thank the reviewer for pointing this out. This is exactly what we intended to say. Each agent (participant) is trained to maximize its own profit, and the learned policies resist the tested unilateral deviations. The joint markup is a case that we construct with human knowledge, in which all generators raise their bids together (collusion). It is not an outcome that self-interested learners are expected to reach.
In the original manuscript, our wording suggested that the independent learners miss a better solution because they do not reach the higher profit of the joint markup. This was a problem of expression in our writing. We did not intend to describe it as a failure of learning.
We appreciate this suggestion, which helps us state the point clearly. Following your comments, we have: