acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Efficient Scalable Oversight via Rewinding

Abstract

Scalable oversight asks how a weak verifier can check the outputs of computations performed by more powerful AI systems. One proposed approach uses relativizing interactive proofs, in which a weak verifier checks the output of a complex oracle-aided computation by interacting with one or more powerful provers. A prominent example is debate, which is highly efficient but assumes that one of two powerful AI models, or provers, is truthful. For certain classes of oracle-aided computations, single-prover relativizing proofs remove this assumption, but at substantially greater computational cost. In this work, we present a new approach to scalable oversight based on relativizing multi-prover interactive proofs (MIPs). We construct a relativizing MIP for computations whose outputs are robust to changing a small fraction of oracle answers. Our construction improves the efficiency of prior single-prover relativizing proofs without assuming that any prover is truthful. Instead, it uses two provers that may coordinate beforehand but cannot communicate during verification. This separation can be realized by interacting with isolated copies of an AI model, or by effectively “rewinding" a single model, provided its state can be reset so that each interaction has access only to its prescribed history. In our MIP construction the honest provers run in nearly the time of the original computation, and the verifier (after a one-time preprocessing step) runs in near-linear time in the input length. We implement our MIP and report results on a preliminary MNIST experiment.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
AI safety, scalable oversight, complexity theory, cryptography, proof systems

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Top 15%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 3.00 over 3 reviews, above 85% of the others.
Reviewer_QHQLOpenReview ↗
Rating
3(+1)
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper provides a new approach for scalable oversight, that is, to show how a weak verifier can check the outputs of a more advance AI systems, using multi-prover interactive proofs via two isolated copies of an AI model, or by "rewinding" a single model. The paper has established a concrete theoretical framework that, given that the outputs of the model is robust, the proposed approach can efficient verify the outputs with theoretical guarantees on correctness and efficiency. The authors also provide a preliminary MNIST experiment to demonstrate the computational efficiency of the protocol.

Critical strengths

The studied problems are very important, and the provided theoretical guarantees appear to be interesting. I could foresee the use-case of the studied theory and the problem being applicable in the near future. Additionally, the author spent substantial effort on the theoretical contributions, which is commendable. The proposed "rewinding" approach is understandable and is intuitive.

Critical weaknesses

There are several critical weaknesses of the paper I would like to point out. One big potential issue is the limited empirical validation. The studied problem seems to be very interesting and would be very much applicable to verifying proofs on generated lean4 code, and the described AI models could potentially be frontier LLMs. However, the author only conducts limited research over MNIST with a highly simplified evaluation. I understand that this is a theoretical paper, but the lack of empirical validation makes it difficult to assess the practical significance of the proposed framework.

Additionally, one other critical issue lies in the assumptions of the outputs, i.e., the robustness. It is unclear how restrictive this assumption is and whether realistic AI reasoning satisfies it, as to me, the robustness assumption makes up the groundwork of the theoretical framework, yet it might be way too restrictive for practice.

Finally, presentation-wise, I found the connection between the theoretical construction and practical scalable oversight somewhat difficult to follow. Could the author explain more on how the theoretical framework could indicate our practical usage on real AI systems, such as usage over LLM?

Questions for authors

Can the authors provide examples of realistic LLM-based tasks that satisfy the required robustness assumption? Can the authors provide more realistic experiments to demonstrate the practical benefits beyond the MNIST setting?

2 comments

Thank you for your comments. We have updated our submission to include an appendix (Appendix F) containing additional experimental results and a table comparing the parameters of our protocol to those of Chen, Kalai and Xi’s single-prover protocol. We have also updated the supplementary material to include code for reproducing the new experiments. We respond to the points you raised below:

Limited empirical validation

We agree that our experiments are limited, and we intended them as an initial proof of concept. Our implementation uses general circuit-based prover and verifier algorithms, rather than algorithms specific to MNIST. In our additional experiments, we use the same underlying machinery with different circuits and oracle inputs.

Following your suggestion, we added an LLM-as-judge experiment using Claude to judge preference pairs (Appendix F.4). When oracle calls are expensive, the prover’s additional computation is small relative to the cost of obtaining the judgments: the prover and direct evaluation each require one oracle call per pair, while proving adds only 0.37–1.04 ms of computation. The verifier requires only 76–84 oracle calls. Even at 256 pairs, it uses about 30% as many calls as direct evaluation; at 16,384 pairs, it uses about 0.51% as many.

These protocol timings use cached judgments; separately, we measured an actual sequence of 84 Claude calls, which took 179 seconds. Unlike the MNIST experiment, where oracle calls are inexpensive, Claude calls dominate the prover’s additional computation. In realistic oversight settings, oracle calls may similarly involve expensive human or model judgments. This highlights the practical value of reducing oracle calls even at relatively small input sizes.

Following reviewer B’s suggestion, we also added a hash-chain experiment (Appendix F.3) to address the limitation that, in the original majority-vote example, the verifier could estimate the answer by sampling oracle calls itself.

Finally, we have also improved the MNIST implementation (Appendix F.1): at 2^{26} views, the verifier takes 1.884 ms, compared with 15.51 ms for direct evaluation, and the prover takes 0.911 seconds; the verifier makes 80 oracle queries. The measurements exclude actual machine-state restoration.

Additionally, one other critical issue lies in the assumptions of the outputs, i.e., the robustness.

Robustness was originally considered by Chen, Kalai, and Xi (ICML 2026). They note that, especially in the case when the oracle represents human judgment, it makes sense to assume that the computation is robust: human judgment is already unstable and error-prone, so as a safeguard, the output of the computation should not change if a small number of the human answers change, otherwise the output is not very meaningful.

One possible way to achieve robustness in a realistic task is to ask multiple oracles the same question (note that we can simulate multiple oracles with one oracle) and then aggregate their answers, for example by taking a majority vote. If the majority is sufficiently far from a tie, then the circuit is robust to changing a small fraction of oracle answers. More generally, the computation could involve applying complicated functions to the oracle answers, as long as the final output is not too sensitive to changes in a small fraction of them. For example, robustness can arise when aggregating preference judgments, as in RLHF and our new LLM-as-judge experiment.

We agree that not all realistic AI tasks will satisfy the robustness assumption. Our result shows that for computations satisfying this assumption, efficient verification is possible without assuming that any of the provers is truthful. We hope that our work will provide a theoretical foundation for future work studying which realistic tasks can be modeled as robust oracle computations.

Could the author explain more on how the theoretical framework could indicate our practical usage on real AI systems, such as usage over LLM?

Yes, we could view the provers as two isolated instances of an LLM that is trained to produce an output together with a label for the output, and the verifier as a smaller model that engages in an interactive protocol (that might rely on human judgment, or some other oracle) with the provers to verify that this label is correct.

We could also imagine this protocol being used in RLHF to efficiently reward the actions of an agent. Now instead of computing the reward directly, we could have the agent propose a reward and engage in an interactive protocol with two isolated copies of the agent as provers to verify that this reward is accurate

Thank you for the detailed response and substantial additional experiments. While I still have some reservations regarding the practical applicability of the framework, particularly whether the robustness assumption extends beyond simple aggregation tasks to more complex LLM reasoning, I find the theoretical contributions interesting, and the additional experiments and clarifications have addressed several of my original concerns. I have therefore decided to raise my rating to 3.

Reviewer_s5HFOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies scalable oversight through relativizing interactive proofs. A weak verifier checks the claims of powerful provers, and both have black-box access to an oracle that model’s sources such as human judgment. Previous approaches are either too costly (single-prover relativizing proofs) or assume, as debate does, that one of the provers is honest. The authors observe that the MIP assumption that provers cannot communicate is easy to enforce for AIs, since a model can be rewound to a previous snapshot so that each interaction sees only its own history. The main contributions are:

  • An encoded-witness IOP for ε-robust oracle circuits. The prover commits to an encoding of the de-oraclized transcript, and the verifier spot-checks O(1/ε) oracle gates against O.
  • A conversion from IOP to two-prover MIP, where the second prover answers a single random query as a consistency check on the first.
  • Amplification with deferred oracle checks: the interaction is repeated, but oracle checks are performed for only one random repetition, which keeps the number of oracle queries low. The results are validated on an implementation of majority circuits over random 6-pixel views of MNIST images, where the oracle is a sparse classifier. The verifier makes 57–60 oracle queries for circuits with 256 to ~1M oracle gates, about 17,000× fewer than direct evaluation at the largest size. The first prover’s cost remains high, at roughly 81,600× direct evaluation.
Critical strengths
  1. The observation that prover isolation is cheap for AIs is interesting and makes MIP feasible in a setting where it was previously considered impractical. It will likely be used in follow-up work.
  2. Removing the honest-prover assumption while keeping soundness against unbounded provers and relativization is a strong result and relevant for AI safety.
  3. The construction is clean and modular. The deferred oracle checks make the oracle cost independent of the number of repetitions, which is a nice, reusable idea.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The experiment is not far from a trivial baseline. For majority circuits with a margin of ~0.31, a verifier with no provers can sample k views and take the majority. The cases where the protocol should help, such as expensive non-oracle computation or small ε, are not tested.
  2. Many computations are fragile, in that a single judgment can decide the outcome. The protocol requires worst-case ε-robustness, and the verifier must know ε. How to obtain or certify ε for realistic tasks should be discussed, as should what happens when it is misspecified.
  3. Section D.1 uses a single random-linear-combination check instead of the per-query check on P2. Since this change reduces the repetitions from ~100 to 9–10 and the reported numbers depend on it, its soundness should be argued in more depth, ideally with a formal proof.
  4. The improvement over Chen, Kalai & Xi is not shown directly, either asymptotically or empirically. The only baseline is Fiat–Shamir applied to the authors’ own IOP.
Questions for authors
  1. Can you add an experiment on a robust circuit with S ≫ q_C, so that the verifier cannot reach the answer by sampling?
  2. How would ε be determined in a realistic task? What guarantees remain if robustness holds only on average?
  3. In practice, for example in agentic deployments with tools and shared environments, which components must be rewound or isolated for the non-communication assumption to hold?
  4. How does your protocol compare with Chen, Kalai & Xi (2026) in prover time, verifier time and oracle queries?
2 comments

Thank you for your comments. We have updated our submission to include an appendix (Appendix F) containing additional experimental results and a table comparing the parameters of our protocol to those of Chen, Kalai and Xi’s single-prover protocol. We have also updated the supplementary material to include code for reproducing the new experiments. We respond to the points you raised below:

Can you add an experiment on a robust circuit with S ≫ q_C, so that the verifier cannot reach the answer by sampling?

Yes. We have added an experiment on a robust oracle circuit with a long hash-chain computation (Appendix F.3). The circuit performs substantial non-oracle computation in addition to its oracle queries, so sampling oracle answers alone does not evaluate the circuit. At 2^{25} chain steps, the online verifier takes approximately 34 ms, compared with 3.46 seconds for direct evaluation. The prover takes approximately 557 seconds.

Following reviewer C’s suggestion, we also added an LLM-as-judge experiment on preference pairs (Appendix F.4), providing a more realistic example of human-feedback aggregation for scalable oversight.

How would ε be determined in a realistic task? What guarantees remain if robustness holds only on average?

One possible way to achieve robustness in a realistic task is to ask multiple oracles the same question (note that we can simulate multiple oracles with one oracle) and then aggregate their answers, for example by taking a majority vote. If the majority is sufficiently far from a tie, then the circuit is robust to changing a small fraction of oracle answers. A lower bound on the margin would therefore give a lower bound on epsilon (note that the verifier only needs to know such a lower bound, rather than the exact value of epsilon). We agree that determining this lower bound may be difficult in general.

Regarding the second question, assuming “robustness holds only on average” means that the circuit is robust on most inputs, note that the definition of robustness we use also captures the case where a circuit is robust on a particular input. That is, even though the definition requires robustness for every input, we can “hardwire” an input x into a circuit C to get a circuit C_x, which on every input runs C on input x. If C is robust on input x, then C_x satisfies our definition of robustness. So if a circuit is robust on most inputs, we can apply our protocol to each of those inputs.

In practice, for example in agentic deployments with tools and shared environments, which components must be rewound or isolated for the non-communication assumption to hold?

For the non-communication assumption to hold, we need to ensure that each prover has access only to its own interaction history. In an agentic setting, this means that we need to isolate the model's conversation history and any external state that could be modified during an interaction and accessed by the other prover. For example, if the model has access to tools that can modify a shared environment, then these would also need to be isolated or restored to their initial state when rewinding. On the other hand, tools that only provide access to read-only information would not need to be isolated.

How does your protocol compare with Chen, Kalai & Xi (2026) in prover time, verifier time and oracle queries?

We have added both asymptotic and concrete comparisons in Appendix F.2. Table 3 compares the parameters of our protocol to the parameters of Chen, Kalai, and Xi’s single-prover protocol. In particular, the verifier running time, verifier query complexity, communication complexity, and round complexity of CKX’s protocol depend multiplicatively of D and d, the depth of the circuit and the number of layers of oracle gates in the circuit, respectively; we remove all dependence on D and d.

Although CKX’s construction is theoretically efficient (all algorithms run in poly-time), it does not translate to practical efficiency: its proof-system machinery introduces substantial overhead at the scales we consider. For a concrete comparison, we instead use rewinding to implement the same IOP that Flock, a state-of-the-art single-prover proof system, compiles cryptographically into a SNARG (Table 4). Across 2^{22}–2^{34} witness bits, our prover is 1.77–2.15× faster; at the largest size, prover time decreases from 19.8 seconds to 10.6 seconds.

Section D.1 uses a single random-linear-combination check... its soundness should be argued in more depth

Thank you for pointing this out. In the updated experiments (Appendix F.1), we use rewinding, as discussed in Section 1, and no longer use the random-linear-combination check. We also choose parameters that achieve the desired soundness in a single execution, without repetition.

Thank you for the detailed rebuttal, which has reinforced my impression that 3 was the right score in the first place.

Reviewer_um9kOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

Multi-prover interactive proofs use multiple provers and a verifier in an adversarial setting to construct proofs in an interactive and adversarial setting. This work makes a contribution to the efficiency and scalability of this process through rewinding, where the verifier is able to reset the provers to prior states to run multiple interactions, without requiring multiple models.

The main contribution is to show that an epsilon robust oracle circuit permits a two prover MIP with probability bounds on correctness and complexity bounds on performance.

The paper is technical and presents formal proofs of complexity guarantees and an example demonstrating the practical applicability of the contribution.

Critical strengths
  1. Strong initial motivation to the problem. Verification of AI outputs is topical and a useful research space.
  2. Clear technical summary/overview of the paper in Section 2.
  3. The proposed technique of "rewinding" a model to a previous state allows one to bootstrap independent verifiers.
  4. Unlike debate, no prover is assumed to be truthful.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Gap between motivation and results. The introduction motivates the work with tasks such as an LLM assessing legal violations from hundreds of pages, but the theorems are built for computations written as ϵ\epsilon-robust Boolean oracle circuits. The paper does not show how a oversight task would be expressed in this form, or whether such a task would be robust.
  2. The experiment does not demonstrate the method's advantage. The experiment circuit is a majority vote of the provers given random sparse views. Doesn't this mean the MNIST verification process could be distilled to a majority vote of sampled views; something like a voting classifier?
  3. The verifier must know ε. In the experiment ϵ\epsilon is computed from all the oracle answers. How would ϵ\epsilon be determined in a real-world setting with potentially unlabelled or mislabelled data?
  4. No quantitative comparison with prior work. The paper claims to improve on the single-prover protocols of Chen, Kalai and Xi (2026), but gives no side-by-side comparison of verifier queries or prover time. Is such a comparison not feasible when moving to MIPs? I think it would still be interesting to see tradeoffs between the MIP and single-prover setup.
Questions for authors

No further clarifications required.

2 comments

Thank you for your comments. We have updated our submission to include an appendix (Appendix F) containing additional experimental results and a table comparing the parameters of our protocol to those of Chen, Kalai and Xi’s single-prover protocol. We have also updated the supplementary material to include code for reproducing the new experiments. We respond to the points you raised below:

Gap between motivation and results

We agree that the connection between our example in the intro and our theoretical results could be clearer. We intended to use this example to motivate the broader problem of scalable oversight, rather than to describe a specific task that our protocol addresses.

Nevertheless, we can model a related problem as follows: instead of determining the exact laws a company has violated based on many pages of records, suppose we want to determine whether a company has violated the majority of laws in some given set. We can define an oracle circuit that, for each law, makes several queries to an oracle (which could represent the judgment of a legal expert) and applies some potentially complicated function to the oracle answers and the documents to determine whether the documents violated the law. The circuit then outputs the majority of these bits. Such a circuit would be robust if for each law, changing a small fraction of the oracle answers would not change the output for that law, and the number of laws violated were sufficiently far from half.

Robustness is the same condition on the underlying oracle computation considered by Chen, Kalai, and Xi (ICML 2026). It also arises naturally when aggregating preference judgments used in RLHF: a majority sufficiently far from a tie remains unchanged when a small fraction of judgments change. Our guarantees apply when a valid lower bound on robustness is available; we do not claim to resolve scalable oversight in general.

The experiment does not demonstrate the method's advantage

We agree that our experiments are limited, and we intended them as an initial proof of concept. Our prover and verifier implement general circuit-based proving machinery; they are not specific to MNIST. The additional experiments use the same underlying machinery with different circuit descriptions and oracle inputs.

To address this concern, we have added two new experiments, described in Appendix F. The first considers an oracle computation with a long hash chain (Appendix F.3), where substantial non-oracle computation must also be performed. This illustrates the advantage of verifying the computation rather than simply sampling oracle answers. The second considers an LLM-as-judge task on preference pairs (Appendix F.4), providing a more meaningful example of the kind of feedback aggregation that arises in scalable oversight and illustrating the benefit of reducing expensive oracle calls.

We have also improved the MNIST implementation (Appendix F.1): at 2^{26} views, the verifier takes 1.884 ms, compared with 15.51 ms for direct evaluation, and the prover takes 0.911 seconds; the verifier makes 80 oracle queries. The measurements exclude actual machine-state restoration.

The verifier must know epsilon... How would epsilon be determined in a real-world setting

One possible way to achieve robustness in a realistic task is to ask multiple oracles the same question (note that we can simulate multiple oracles with one oracle) and then aggregate their answers, for example by taking a majority vote. If the majority is sufficiently far from a tie, then the circuit is robust to changing a small fraction of oracle answers. A lower bound on the margin would therefore give a lower bound on epsilon (note that the verifier only needs to know such a lower bound, rather than the exact value of epsilon). We agree that determining this lower bound may be difficult in general.

No quantitative comparison with prior work

We have added both asymptotic and concrete comparisons in Appendix F.2. Table 3 compares the parameters of our protocol to the parameters of Chen, Kalai, and Xi’s single-prover protocol. In particular, the verifier running time, verifier query complexity, communication complexity, and round complexity of CKX’s protocol depend multiplicatively of D and d, the depth of the circuit and the number of layers of oracle gates in the circuit, respectively; we remove all dependence on D and d.

Although CKX’s construction is theoretically efficient (all algorithms run in poly-time), it does not translate to practical efficiency: its proof-system machinery introduces substantial overhead at the scales we consider. For a concrete comparison, we instead use rewinding to implement the same IOP that Flock, a state-of-the-art single-prover proof system, compiles cryptographically into a SNARG (Table 4). Across 2^{22}–2^{34} witness bits, our prover is 1.77–2.15× faster; at the largest size, prover time decreases from 19.8 seconds to 10.6 seconds.

Thank you for your thoughtful responses. I will maintain my rating.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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