- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
In this work, a methodology for defending neural network weights against side-channel attacks is proposed. The methodology is intuitive and effective and trains alternative versions of layers for each part of the network to limit the leakage of individual paramaters/paths. Authors show this effectively mitigates first-order SCA leakage, and provide some initial results indicating
Critical strengths
- Important problem. I think SCA defenses for ML-models are useful and more practical approaches that work on standard hardware are especially relevant.
- Intuitive and simple approach that works well to mitigate direct leakage of weights with relatively minimal classification performance impact.
Critical weaknesses
- The adaptive attack procedure does not seem strong enough. I would suggest considering a profiled setting where the attacker can train a small classifier model directly on traces to predict . While this is less realistic as a threat model, it ensures we see what is possible against this defense. I would not really consider failing against this threat model to be a weakness, however, I am not convinced by the current unsupervised approach as it depends on getting each step right which is hard to do and potentially overly optimistic. The profiled setting would show whether an attack is feasible in worst-case settings, which also gives broader insights into what might be possible for a more determined unsupervised attacker.
- The overhead is unclear to me (both training and inference). During training what is the memory overhead and extra time cost? Similarly `for each inference' might mean per batch of inputs or per single input. Additionally, if each batch uses a fixed path, could an adaptive attacker not exploit this? Conversely, if you have to swap path per input I imagine inference overhead is quite high?
- Only CNNs/MLPs are tested. Maybe a small ResNet is useful for generality of the approach to more modern architectures.
Questions for authors
- Can you run an adaptive attack where you try to predict what version of each/a layer is used using a supervised classifier (if traces are synchronized a small MLP should be reasonably quick to train)?
- Can you provide overhead numbers for both training/inference n terms of memory footprint and time?
minor clarifications:
- Is it really necessary to already have copies do this during training? Is it not feasible to take a trained, unprotected model and create alternative new versions of layers that preserve the input-output behavior per layer?
- How does this combine with cryptanalytic extraction? It seems like it should make it harder implicitly? Can this defense be combined with [40]?
2 comments
Response
I would like to thank the authors for their rebuttal. After also reading the other reviews and answers, as remarked by reviewer PKWq I think a core concern that complicates the evaluations is the lack of a concrete attack (which works on the unprotected model to retrieve weights) to measure defense performance on. Overall, I am therefore not convinced the parent in its current form clearly beats the bar for acceptance. I will reduce my score to 2. I think a lot of the issues that the paper is addressing are real and I like the simplicity of the approach. However, in addition to the remaining questions on my original review (see below), the current manuscript does not clearly demonstrate that the defense actually helps against parameter retrieval attacks that would otherwise succeed.
W1/Q1: Besides this, the adaptive results with supervised models recovering it are not helpful to the story in my view. While indeed the assumptions are quite strong, (i) and (ii) should be feasible to waive for attackers that are optimizing DL models (for the attack, very long misaligned raw traces are feasible to use for attack even against masked cryptographic traces, see e.g. [R1,R2]). If accuracy is 99% with these assumptions indicating that the value is index is leaking quite strongly, I would expect that a determined practical attacker could feasibly overcome these limitations.
W2/3: Thanks for clarifying, sorry I missed these before.
Q2: On the inference overhead in Table 1: I saw this, my question was more whether this is per image overhead, or overhead for processing 100 images sequentially (incl. per image weight swaps for the protected case)? I think both should be included.
Q3: While I appreciate these issues could/would be real in theory, authors have not demonstrated them empirically. Why would a clever post-hoc procedure not be able to overcome these issues? Maybe through using your objectives only for post-hoc construction of alternative layers? I would recommend including attempting some naive post-hoc baselines that demonstrate these issues.
Q4: I would again recommend demonstrating this experimentally. In my view, in a threat model where we care about side-channel extraction we should likely care at least as much about cryptanalytic extraction. Therefore, some experiments here testing how this defense affects the resistance against these would be useful. Additionally, in case it does not resolve the attack, the combination with [40] should also be relatively straightforward to test.
[R1]: Lu, X., Zhang, C., Cao, P., Gu, D., & Lu, H. (2021). Pay attention to raw traces: A deep learning architecture for end-to-end profiling attacks. IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems, 235-274.
[R2]: Perin, G., Wu, L., & Picek, S. (2022). Exploring feature selection scenarios for deep learning-based side-channel analysis. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 828-861
We thank the reviewer for their valuable feedback and thoughtful questions. We appreciate the time and effort taken to review our submission. Below, we address weakness (W) and questions (Q) in detail.
W1/Q1. We implement a supervised deep-learning side-channel analysis that predicts the parameter-version selector r1 using 1D CNN and ResNet architectures trained on aligned EM traces of DENSE_1, with 2,000 fixed-input traces (for the lack of time to train on 20K raw measurements) per selector and a 60/20/20 split. For V=3, both achieve ~99% test accuracy against a 33.33% baseline; for V=8, ~99.5% against a 12.50% baseline. These results are obtained under three favorable conditions not available to our threat model attacker: (i) the execution region is pre-identified, (ii) traces are pre-aligned, and (iii) ground-truth selector labels are available for supervised training, obtained in our experiments from instrumented acquisition metadata. Under practical threat model, the attacker cannot observe or control selector labels, so obtaining equivalent labeled traces requires additional access beyond what is assumed. The unsupervised attack reflects what is feasible without labeled data, while the profiled attack shows the worst-case ceiling. Additionally, successful selector classification does not directly recover model parameters, though it may facilitate subsequent extraction.
W2 Training memory overhead: Parameter memory scales exactly V× since V independent weight matrices are stored per protected layer, reflected in the model size column of Table 1 (2.29–4.33× for MNIST MLP at V=2–8). Gradient memory is effectively 1× per layer regardless of V, since Algorithm 1 zeros out gradients for all versions not on the active path. Only one version accumulates gradients per mini-batch. Training time overhead: The increase (1.85×–30.10×) comes from two sources: the forward/backward pass through one randomly selected path per mini-batch, comparable to single-model training; and the diversity loss pairwise similarity computation across all V versions, which scales as O(V²) per layer and dominates at large V, explaining the superlinear growth in Table 1. Per-input vs per-batch path selection: Path selection happens per inference call, where each call processes a single input. The selector vector is sampled freshly per input not fixed across a batch. So each TFLite interpreter call receives its own independently sampled selector tensor. The inference time in Table 1 (averaged over 100 runs) reflects this per-input overhead.
W3 We evaluate EfficientNet real-world model attacked in prior work [32] and report security improvement in Table I.
Q2 Please refer to Table 1 where we report model size, training and inference time and security improvement for MLP, CNN and EfficientNet models.
Q3 While generating diverse versions post-hoc from a pre-trained model is appealing, it faces a fundamental challenge: composability. The defense requires that any combination of versions across layers produces accurate output, not merely that each version is accurate in isolation. Post-hoc perturbations to layer i change its output distribution in ways that layer i+1 trained on a fixed predecessor was never exposed to, breaking composability. Additionally, perturbations large enough to provide meaningful Euclidean distance for TVLA suppression are likely to degrade accuracy, while perturbations small enough to preserve accuracy may not provide sufficient diversity to suppress leakage below 4.5. The proposed training procedure solves both problems by construction: stochastic path selection guarantees composability across all V^L combinations, and the diversity regularizer λdiv provides principled control over the diversity-accuracy trade-off.
Q4. The proposed defense implicitly hardens against cryptanalytic extraction because these attacks rely on deterministic input-output behavior. The same query must produce the same response for the algebraic recovery to work. Since our defense randomly selects a different version combination per inference, the same input produces different outputs across calls, breaking this consistency requirement and increasing the query complexity of any cryptanalytic attack. Furthermore, the proposed defense and [40] are directly combinable, as both operate at training time through loss modifications targeting orthogonal properties. Cryptanalytic defense enforces query-response obfuscation against black-box API attacks while our diversity regularizer enforces parameter separation for side-channel resistance. The two terms can be added into a single unified training objective, providing simultaneous protection against both physical side-channel extraction on edge devices and cryptanalytic extraction in MLaaS settings.