- The soundness of provided security analysis and missing evaluation of practical threats.
- Thm 3 is close to tautological from my point of view. The leakage function Lconc includes the full compartment coordinate views Gcmp (all document and query coordinates). The simulation proof therefore only shows that the PRF, PRP and AEAD wrappers add nothing beyond that. Everything that matters for confidentiality of embeddings and queries is inside the declared leakage, and that leakage is never bounded.
- CCADPE is an affine map plus small bounded noise. The authors do not present a theoretical or empirical analysis of known-plaintext attacks (KPA), where with roughly d+1 known (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs in the same compartment, least squares recovers the map. The corpora used here are public. In a realistic deployment, many records could also be known or injected.
- Compartments may be re-linkable into a global frame. All compartments of a path are coordinate subsets of the same globally rotated ciphertext, and it seems to me that the noise is sampled once for each document but not per copy. With rc = 256 out of 512 semantic coordinates, two random subsets share about 128 coordinates in expectation. Each query sends coordinates to 128 probed cells, all derived from one uq. Their union covers essentially all 512 coordinates. I believe an adversary could stitch replicas and query coordinates across cells. That would undo both the "no shared global frame" claim and the unrelated per-cell aliases.
- Lexical index stores (alias,bl(i),Quant(xi,t)) as posting entries. A lexical document has a single alias in its partition, and that same alias appears in every posting list containing the document. The server therefore holds a full document–keyed-term incidence matrix with quantized BM25 weights, plus document frequencies (BktSize), plus SearchEq for query terms. This is strictly more than classic SSE leakage, leading to concerns of leakage-abuse attacks (Islam-Kuzu-Kantarcioglu (NDSS'12) and Cash et al.'s count attack (CCS’15)).
- The solution does not support malicious security, integrity, forward/backward privacy and updates.
- Novelty of presented schemes: all components of the paper are largely known by the literature. For example, SAP/CADPE is adopted by ppRAG, ALSH MIPS-to-L2, feature hashing, mean-centered spherical IVF, HMAC-keyed inverted index (SSE), RRF, etc. The idea of supporting encrypted search on both dense and sparse index is also not new (Pisces); this proposed DuetER is faster indeed, but also more leaky in security. The compartment projection in CCADPE is indeed novel, but the security of such compartment raises concerns (see above).
- Evaluations.
- The 192.7x latency and 637x communication comparison in Table 2 is not like-for-like in that DuetER is more leaky by construction. Also, it uses only FiQA (57K documents, 300 queries), and the two systems ran on different machines (laptop vs. VM).
- The leakage validation is shallow. It does not state an adversary with adaptive knowledge (knowing the deployed defense) and presents more powerful attacks.
- RQ2 states "how does it compare against SOTA private-RAG baselines," but the comparison is limited to only 2 previous schemes, PRAG and Pisces. Authors are encouraged to present more baselines and compare more methods, either quantitatively or qualitatively. Potentially missing related works [1-7] and concurrent works [8-11]. In particular, MESS [8] assumes perfect cross-shard association in its formal bound. It also empirically evaluates linkage attacks. Tremblay Thibault et al. [9] argue that honest-but-curious encrypted protocols open reaction attacks. If the client acts on decrypted unverified data, its observable behavior becomes a function of the plaintext. DuetER’s Fetch step is exactly such a behavior.
- Relatively unsatisfactory presentation. The figure 1 that presents the scheme is full of text and hard to follow. The caption is literally "Framework of DuetER" without any further elaboration. Additionally, the main body of the paper never mentions it at all. Authors are advised to revise this figure to contain better visual elements, more vivid icon layout, and use it to improve the introduction of their scheme, ideally with some toy examples to help general audience understand. The aesthetics of figure 2 and 3 can also be improved. Figure 2 looks compressed due to limited space, and figure 3 uses a 3D layout that introduces more confusion than what the information it offers.
[1] Yingfan Liu et al., “Privacy-Preserving Approximate Nearest Neighbor Search on High-Dimensional Data,” ICDE 2025. This is a DCPE-based vector search work.
[2] Jinhao Zhu et al., “Compass: Encrypted Semantic Search with High Accuracy,” OSDI 2025.
[3] Jingyu Li et al., “PANTHER: Private Approximate Nearest Neighbor Search in the Single Server Setting,” ACM CCS 2025.
[4] Sacha Servan-Schreiber et al., “Private Approximate Nearest Neighbor Search with Sublinear Communication,” IEEE S&P 2022.
[5] Alexandra Henzinger et al., “Private Web Search with Tiptoe,” SOSP 2023.
[6] Mingxun Zhou et al., “PACMANN: Efficient Private Approximate Nearest Neighbor Search,” ICLR 2025.
[7] Yulong Ming et al., “P²RAG: Privacy-Preserving RAG Service Supporting Arbitrary Top-k Retrieval,” arXiv (2603.14778).
[8] Haoyu Cui et al., “MESS: Fast and Private Semantic Search on Multi-Graph HNSW,” arXiv (2607.28999).
[9] Louis Tremblay Thibault et al., “Quantization Enables Private Dense Retrieval against Malicious Service Providers,” arXiv preprint 2026 (2609.36376).
[10] Peichun Hua et al., “Pointing the Way, Hiding the Destination: Practical Private Dense Retrieval at Scale,” arXiv preprint 2026 (2608.25735).
[11] Peichun Hua et al., “Spruce: Scalable Private Outsourced Retrieval Using Compact Embeddings,” arXiv preprint 2026 (2609.03376).