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Paper summary
The paper proposes SODE-Guard for intrusion detection, evolving latent representations through a neural SDE and averaging predictions over random trajectories. It derives robustness bounds for the averaged predictor and individual paths, and evaluates predictive performance, ablations, and efficiency on three datasets.
Critical strengths
1.The robustness analysis distinguishes averaged predictions from individual trajectories and addresses the discretised SDE model. 2.Ablations examine diffusion, spectral normalisation, multi-path inference, and regularisation, helping assess individual components.
Critical weaknesses
1.Insufficient design motivation. The introduction outlines the method but does not adequately explain how latent stochastic dynamics and anti-concentration regularisation address specific limitations of existing approaches. 2.Figure quality and proofreading. Figure 1 is crowded, with some text extending beyond boxes. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) have inconsistent plotting dimensions and alignment. The figures should be redrawn or carefully revised for readability. 3.Limited baseline coverage. Several baselines date from 2022. Although IDS-GraphMamba (2025) is included, comparisons should also cover recent methods directly targeting adversarial or certified robustness under the same threat model. 4.Disconnect between certification theory and experiments. Section 4 explicitly states that the evaluated encoder does not satisfy Assumption 1, and no certified radii are reported. The central certification contribution therefore remains unvalidated on the experimental models. 5.Incomplete adaptive attack evaluation. Results mainly rely on PGD-40 against the eight-path average. Larger-budget EOT and attack ensembles are not reported, leaving insufficient evidence to rule out gradient masking and substantiate the empirical robustness claims.
Questions for authors
1.Are random trajectories resampled during PGD? Are results available for larger EOT budgets or other adaptive attacks?
Response to reviewer kdck: Update after the five-seed re-run (see also the general update)
Thank you again for the constructive review. Here is how the update answers each point.
Q1 (paths during PGD). Every attack is scored under both settings:
The two agree closely. Worst-case macro-F1 for SODE-Guard with EOT-matched adversarial training is 0.420 with fixed paths and 0.412 with fresh paths.
W5 (adaptive attacks). Adversarial training through the deployed 8-path predictor, with fresh paths in every step (module 2), raises worst-case macro-F1 from 0.245 to 0.420 ± 0.010 over five seeds (Holm-adjusted p = 0.016). That is on par with an adversarially trained MLP (0.424) and neural ODE (0.432); the differences are not significant. The masking checks pass. A full-strength re-check of seed 0 (PGD-200 with 5 restarts, EOT-32, a 256-path expected-margin attack, Square with 5,000 queries) is still running now.
W4 (certification). SODE-Guard is now certified with randomised smoothing over the input and its own Brownian paths. Certified accuracy at l2 radius 0.273 is 0.556 ± 0.033, against 0.096 with Theorem A before. That is on par with a smoothed MLP (0.555). Reweighted to the test class mix, it is 0.843.
W3 (recent and strong baselines). We added:
The trees reach the highest clean macro-F1 (0.61-0.62) but fall to 0.02-0.04 under a black-box Square attack, while adversarially trained neural models keep about 0.42. The revision discusses BARS (NDSS 2023) and MARS (2025) as certified traffic classifiers with anisotropic smoothing, a natural extension of module 3.
W1, W2 (motivation, figures). The robustness gap of the strongest clean models gives the revision a concrete motivation:
Figures 1-2 will be redrawn around the three modules and the clean / worst-case / certified trade-off.
Running now, for the revision:
We hope the update addresses your concerns, and would be grateful if you could consider it in your final assessment. Thank you.