- Rating
- 1(−1)
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 1(−1)
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 1(−1)
Read review
Paper summary
This paper proposes Iphis, a text steganography protocol that uses pivot words to encode two semantic readings in one text carrier. Experiments on a synthetic semantic channel and a real-LLM pipeline evaluate payload capacity, stream independence, naturalness, and detectability under a specified detector suite.
Critical strengths
- Novel problem formulation. The paper treats polysemy as a resource for encoding two semantic streams in one carrier, extending the conventional single-stream setting.
- Evaluation of key protocol properties. The authors test the method on both a synthetic channel and a real-LLM pipeline. Per-stream key-scrambling experiments provide evidence that decoding one stream can fail while the other remains recoverable.
Critical weaknesses
-
Scalability beyond two streams remains unclear. The main experiments focus on the dual-stream setting. In the higher-width boundary experiments, retry-exhaustion rates reach 85.9%–94.8% at , raising concerns about the sampling cost of extending the protocol.
-
Dependence on a curated semantic space. The protocol uses a synthetic knowledge base with hand-annotated pivots and is evaluated with one model in one language. Its applicability to broader, naturally occurring semantic resources remains unclear.
-
Limited robustness to transformations. The paper states that repetition does not address paraphrasing. It also does not evaluate a warden adaptively trained against the protocol, so the security results should be interpreted within the tested settings.
Questions for authors
-
Can the protocol support three or more streams? Would this require a separate semantic domain for each stream, or could multiple streams share a semantic space? What trade-offs in decoding reliability and rejection-sampling cost would this introduce?
-
What role does LLM understanding of puns play? Since Iphis uses a predefined semantic space and extraction rules, how does its protocol-defined ambiguity differ from an LLM’s contextual interpretation of natural puns?
-
How should “independent keys” be understood? The paper reports per-stream key-scrambling experiments, while the protocol pseudocode refers to a shared key . Could the authors clarify whether the streams use separate keys, derived keys, or independent key interventions only for evaluation?
-
Could a multi-stream design still use a surface/inner-layer structure? For example, could one reading remain the surface interpretation while additional streams are encoded as separate inner readings? What changes to the extraction rules would be required?
5 comments
Response to Reviewer 9e3m - Part 2
Critical Weakness 2: applicability to broader naturally occurring semantic resources
Thank you for pointing out this critical gap. We do agree that the coverage of the semantic channel decides how far the protocol can go. We considered several possible extensions during the research stage. However, as the initial step of a line of work, we submitted the best we can do at the current time, to implement the protocol itself with available resource at that time.
About model. For the main closed loop we used a single renderer, deepseek-chat with reasoning off. The receiver side is already checked across three models, since Qwen3-30B-A3B(2/2 frames) and DeepSeek-V3.2(1/2) re-decode the B stream from frozen carriers. During the rebuttal we added a second renderer, Qwen3-14B, which closes the loop at 10/10 frames, and a third, GLM-4-9B, which fails to encode at 0/10. The failure is in the render-and-extract round trip, not in the sampler. Due to the lack of a stable and compliant source of services, we did not use GPT and Claude.
About language and scale. In the early stage of the research, we did consider building a bilingual knowledge base and found the English pun benchmark SemEval Task 7. However, after carefully checking, we found that it could not be directly used for the experiment. (Another potential source of multilingualism is the "Kakekotoba" in Japanese rhetoric, but there still lacks of available constructions.) Moreover, the English knowledge base requires additional effort to handle possible language-specific problems. Therefore, this work was temporarily put on hold. Similarly, the larger language database stopped at the diffuculties of construction basis. We found a terminology database (TermOnline) that could potentially serve. But batch access to TermOnline requires an agreement and we were unable to finish the signing process at that time.
We are now going to extent our work from three aspects. More domain pairs, chosen to span different degrees of structural overlap rather than just more of the same. An English knowledge base, to separate what is language-specific from what is not. And a renderer spectrum rather than a single model, since our own runs show that encodability is renderer-dependent. All the extension should be by selection rather than by volume. Each added unit has to be checked for whether the renderer can express it and whether the receiver can extract it, and units that fail that check are not useful even if they are semantically valid.
Critical Weakness 3: robustness to transformations and adaptive warden
Thank you for raising this critical issue for practical steganography. We sincerely accept the critics. Then we will report the attempts we have made and what we found useful to improve the work.
Robustness to rewriting. Our submission contains the ablation for repetition, which is an error-tolerance mechanism, nothing to do against rewriting. The difficulty of resisting rewriting attack is that the cue is lexical and appears once. Rewriting of pivot words will exactly remove it. The potential solution is push the cue toward structure and pragmatics, instead of vocabulary. But now our extractor has not been able to read it yet. The improvement direction includes structure cues, a second cue of different type in the same sentence and a bit-error curve against attack strength.
Adaptive warden. During the discussion, we conducted some additional experiments to determine the separability of carriers. Against news and Wikipedia text(500 sentences each) the carriers separate at 0.952 and 0.888, and two topic-matched covers at about 0.98. For more precise attribution, we add a plain text control, which seperates at 0.808. So most of the 0.952 is the renderer, and the second reading contributes about 0.14. Our attempts to suppress it never got below 0.916 against a target of 0.85. Our interpretation is that the pivot is itself unusual in this genre: a news sentence does not normally contain the vocabulary containing the second reading, so the carrier is weird before it encodes anything. An adaptive warden would learn exactly that weirdness, which is why we think the answer is a renderer that can carry a second reading in words the genre would use anyway, not a better key. However, all is not lost. The example of rhymes proposed in §1 proved that proper genre can absorb anomaly. "Damp green thoughts were screaming on the bed" appearing in an ICLR 2027 submission could be regarded as a failed generation, but a fantastic verse in avant-garde poem.
We are looking forward for the next experiments as follows: an adaptive warden with a renderer-matched control, and a construction whose second reading rides on words the genre would use anyway.
Response to Reviewer 9e3m - Part 3
Answer to Question 1 and 4
First of all, please allow us to give the general conclusion: a third or more streams are possible in principle, but the real bottleneck is the semantic graph construction.
For semantic spaces, a stream is a reading, which relies on a hypothesis plus a set of cues the receiver can verify. Streams with disjoint cue sets can share one semantic space. A separate domain per stream is one way to guarantee that, not a requirement. If two streams share one coordinate space and one sentence with proper segmentation, they can be separated by which reading's cues fire.
For trade-offs, each added bit per position grows the label, and under blind rejection the acceptance per position falls as 2^-q while a frame needs all N positions, so at q = 4 only about one frame in eight survives. We measured the retry cost by enumerating the legal coordinates and raising r_max, and finally restored 999/1000 frames. So what binds is the size of the resource (every target bucket must be non-empty, N ≳ 2^q ln(1/ε)) and decoding reliability, since each added reading brings its own extraction error and must be told apart from the others.
However, semantic space segmentation and reject-sampling costs are not the only obstacles for multistream extension. The weirdness of such generated text will result in extra fragility to adaptive warden, as we already answered in the discussion for Critical Weakness 3. It shares a lot related to Q4, so we combine the two responses here.
For Q4. There are two methods to add the third stream. The first one is to "stack" another layer of reading on the second meaning, leading to a three-way polysemy of one pivot. However, the triple semantics are extremely rare in natural language and the possibility of construction remains purely theoretical. The second approach is parallelly embedding two readings into the same inner layer, each with its own independent pivot. It sounds more possible. But the real cost is weirdness. Each inner reading brings its own pivot vocabulary, which makes the sentence looks odd. Carriers with two kinds of weirdness will be even worse. Whether there exists a genre can absorb that much weirdness remains an open question. It is definitely a difficult construction problem.
Answer to Question 2
Natural puns are indeed where our journey began. The very first construct of this study emerged from a discussion on translating natural puns(from Japanese to Chinese). However, finally the protocol does not ask the model to understand a pun. Because a pun is one kind of dual meaning, not the only one: the same ambiguity carries metaphor, irony and the oracle, and humor is only one of the effects it can serve. The construction of Iphis realises dual readings in a single sentence based on the pair (a, b) and the context, leaving a cue the extractor can use. Extraction is rule-based, leaving nothing to do with "understanding".
This is also why encodability depends on the renderer rather than on the protocol. Qwen3-14B closes 10/10 frames, while GLM-4-9B fails at 0/10 with carrier extraction mismatching. What Iphis depends on is cue realisation, not interpretation.
In the paper we have made a contrast: "for them the second reading is an interpretation to be judged; for Iphis it is a state fixed by the candidate space and recovered under the key." The second reading of natural pun is open-ended. It is whatever the hearer makes of it, it is not tied to a declared unit, and there is nothing to authenticate. In Iphis what we want is a knowledge-gated information hiding, where the second reading can be extracted, keyed and authenticated. Dual meaning is a channel rather than a rhetorical effect. The literary fluency, innovation and humor can enhance stealthiness, but are not essential.
Answer to Question 3
Thank you for pointing out this mistake. It is our fault that caused this inconsistency. The pseudocode in submission gives one master key and one PRF, with both label bits taken from the same digest, which is consistent with the code in the anonymous repository. §4.6 and the appendix describe per-side keys. The protocol path never implemented that derivation and the side keys were only used in the audit path. We should have checked it to match the code, and we are not defending the wording.
During this discussion period we have changed the implementation so that each stream gets its own key derived from the master key. With that we conducted some experiments. The result shows that scrambling one side destroys only its payload (BER 0.502 for B, 0.490 for A) while the other side is preserved bit for bit. Isolation is now a property of the construction rather than a path in the audit code.
This change does not move the numbers: acceptance is 0.4974 at q = 1, 0.2458 at q = 2, and 0.2459 for the matched single stream at q = 2, against 0.498 / 0.246 / 0.246 in the paper.
Response to Reviewer 9e3m - Part 1
Thank you for the review which we have read again and again, as a set of directions rather than only assessment. The concerns mentioned critical weakness and questions are where this line of work has to go next, and they are useful for us to improve the submission. We tried our best to response your opinions and questions in order(including a combination for Q1 and Q4). We also report the experiments we could run during the rebuttal.
Critical Weakness 1: scalability beyond two streams
Thank you for this insightful question. We decompose the discussion of scalability into two levels, a third stream(even more) and a wider label. Both of the issues were discussed during the research stage, but not so thorough. And your review prompted us to revisit it.
A third stream means introducing a third reading into the sentences. That is to say, building a triple semantic graph. Although the dual semantic graph of Iphis was constructed manually, it still adhered to the pivot words inherent in natural language. Triple semantic, by the contrast, is extremely rare in natural language. Thus the obstacle to a third stream would be the resource, rather than the sampler.
On the other hand, we did report the retry exhaustion for a wider label q = 3 and q = 4, which seemed impossible to construct a wider label. We found the bottleneck is accpetance rate: under blind rejection a candidate matches with probability 2^-q, and a frame succeeds only if all N positions succeed, so the cost compounds. The measurement in the submitted manuscript was only the average of single attempt, thus it only reflected the success rate under certain maximum retries(r_max = 96).
The tablet above shows measurements during this discussion. Frame success at the finite-alphabet boundary, rebuilt offline with the same channel, label function and codec (256 physical positions, five seeds × 200 frames = 1,000 frames per cell). Rows with nonce retries = 1 are the submitted configuration; rows with 4 are the protocol's nonce retries. The submitted boundary reports 991/1000 and 982/1000 at q = 3 and 141/1000 and 52/1000 at q = 4 under a single attempt, which our rebuild reproduces (0.992 and 0.116). "Enumeration" means the encoder lists the legal coordinates and draws among the label matches with P0 weights, which has the same distribution as rejection sampling but no 2^-q draw cost.
The results show that a wider label are feasible, but how to reduce the cost to a reasonable level is another issue to be considered.