acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

NeuralGrad: Multi-Scale Gradient Reactivity for Open-World Network Intrusion Detection

Abstract

Neural network-based intrusion detection systems achieve high accuracy on known attacks but fail to detect novel threats in real-world deployments. We address three fundamental challenges: (1) detecting out-of-distribution attacks from unseen families, (2) adapting to novel attacks from labeled examples, and (3) capturing multi-scale temporal patterns from packets to sessions. We propose **NeuralGrad**, a framework leveraging *gradient reactivity*, the structured response of network layers during inference, captured via intermediate activation gradients. Our contributions are (1) Gradient Reactivity Maps (GRM): A learned representation where in-distribution inputs produce low-rank gradient patterns while out-of-distribution inputs project far outside. We prove OOD separability unconditionally in the NTK regime and under testable regularity conditions generally. (2) Multi-Scale Dual-Stream Transformer: Hierarchical architecture with parallel temporal/spatial attention at packet, flow, and session scales. (3) Gradient-Space Prototypical Networks: Few-shot classification via gradient-space prototypes, exploiting higher ambient dimensionality than feature space. On 14.8M samples across eight datasets: 98.7% closed-world accuracy, 94.5% AUROC on novel attacks (+8.7% over prior work), 87.4% accuracy with 3 labeled examples (+29.8% over baselines), and 0.71 ms edge inference.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Network Intrusion Detection, Out-of-Distribution Detection, Gradient Reactivity, Few-Shot Learning, Prototypical Networks, Multi-Scale Transformers, Open-World Learning, Zero-Day Attack Detection, Directional Subspace Separation, Leakage-Free Evaluation

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_8YxrOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

NeuralGrad uses a uniform-target probe to extract activation gradients across network layers and learns a gradient representation alongside multiscale traffic features. It combines feature and gradient scores for unknown-attack detection and uses prototypical classification for few-shot adaptation. The paper evaluates both tasks on network-intrusion benchmarks and provides a theoretical account of gradient-space separation.

Critical strengths

Using a shared gradient representation for unknown-attack detection and few-shot adaptation gives the method a coherent practical purpose. Experiments on both tasks provide useful support for the overall approach.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The improvement over existing learned gradient representations is not directly established.

Low-Dimensional Gradient Helps OOD Detection already reduces parameter gradients, learns a classifier on them, and combines forward and backward scores. NeuralGrad’s distinctive contribution is the use of activation gradients across layers and their nonlinear aggregation.

The comparisons with feature representations, fixed gradient scores, and an analyzer-free variant support the overall system, but leave a central comparison missing: an existing learned gradient representation on the same backbone. Without this comparison, the experiments provide limited evidence of how much the proposed representation advances detection and few-shot adaptation beyond closely related approaches.

  1. Two steps in the gradient-separation argument require additional assumptions.

Equation (25), p. 21, states ∣ΠG∣2≤(r/Dg)∣G∣2|\Pi G|^2\leq(r/D_g)|G|^2. Taking Dg=2D_g=2, r=1r=1, Π=diag⁡(1,0)\Pi=\operatorname{diag}(1,0), and G=(1,0)⊤G=(1,0)^\top gives 1 on the left and 1/21/2 on the right. Projection rank alone therefore does not establish this pointwise bound; the argument needs an additional condition on gradient directions.

Equation (40), p. 25, derives a lower bound on embedding distances from a Lipschitz upper bound. A constant mapping satisfies the Lipschitz condition while collapsing all distances to zero. This step requires an additional condition controlling contraction. Both issues affect the theoretical explanation of why the learned representation preserves useful separation.

Questions for authors

What evidence shows the benefit of cross-layer activation gradients over an existing learned gradient representation on the same backbone, for detection and few-shot adaptation? Is such a comparison included in the current experiments?

What additional assumptions are needed for Eqs. (25) and (40), and how are those assumptions justified for the representations learned by NeuralGrad?

Tables 4 and 43 on pp. 6 and 33 assign different split labels to the CIC-IDS2017 results of 96.8/89.2. Does the main table report the random split or the leakage-controlled split?

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal of Submission 13007 by Authors

We thank the reviewer for the precise analysis. Both counterexamples are correct, and both proofs now state the assumption they need. Below we show that the learned-gradient comparison is largely already in the paper, and we add the missing piece. (Revised PDF numbering: Thm 5 → Thm 3, Thm 6 → Thm 4.)

W1 / Q1. Cross-layer activation gradients vs. learned gradient representations

LDG's recipe has three ingredients: low-dimensional reduction of gradients, a score learned on them, and forward+backward fusion. The submission already isolates each against NeuralGrad on the same trained backbone and gradients (CIC-IDS2017, Table 37):

Gradient representationAUROC
Scalar norm (GradNorm L1 / L2 / per-layer)88.4 / 88.9 / 90.1
Linear low-dim reduction + Mahalanobis (LDG-style)89.8
Raw gradients + Mahalanobis91.2
Raw cross-layer GRM, no analyzer (Table 5)91.4
Learned non-linear cross-layer analyzer, sgs_g94.5
sgs_g + forward fusion, sfgs_{fg}96.8

The component the reviewer identifies as distinctive, learned non-linear cross-layer aggregation, adds +4.7 over linear low-dim reduction and +3.1 over the raw cross-layer GRM in gradient space alone. Fusion (shared with LDG) then adds a further +2.3. The gain therefore comes from the representation, not from fusion.

Same backbone for every method (Table 39, shared 2.8M Transformer): sgs_g averages 89.6 vs. GradPCA 84.7, GradNorm 83.9 and ViM 83.2, and leads GradPCA on every dataset (+3.7 to +5.7). Giving baselines our uniform reference does not close the gap: GradPCA reaches only 89.2 with it (Table 53).

Few-shot (Table 6): gradient-only prototypes reach 80.9% at 3 shots, vs. 47.8% for feature-space ProtoNet with the same backbone and the same nearest-centroid rule (Table 5), and 57.6% for MetaOptNet. LDG has no few-shot mechanism; on the shared representation, NeuralGrad does both tasks.

The one comparison not in the paper is LDG itself, i.e. a learned classifier on low-dimensional parameter gradients. We are adding it on the same backbone and checkpoint to Tables 37 and 6, for both detection and few-shot.

Q2. Assumptions for Eqs. (25) and (40), and their justification

Eq. (25). Correct: rank alone gives only ∥ΠG∥2≤∥G∥2\|\Pi G\|^2\le\|G\|^2. The revised theorem proves an exact identity for any OOD law QQ: EQ∥Π⊥G∥2EQ∥G∥2=1−aQ,aQ=tr(ΠΣQ)tr ΣQ.\frac{\mathbb E_Q\|\Pi^\perp G\|^2}{\mathbb E_Q\|G\|^2}=1-a_Q,\qquad a_Q=\frac{\mathrm{tr}(\Pi\Sigma_Q)}{\mathrm{tr}\,\Sigma_Q}. The added direction condition is aQ<1−1/κa_Q<1-1/\kappa, which is necessary and sufficient for separation. The reviewer's example is aQ=1a_Q=1, which no subspace-residual score can separate. The pointwise form holds only under explicit isotropy (Dasgupta–Gupta; failure ≤1.2×10−3\le1.2\times10^{-3} at our (r,Dg)(r,D_g)). Justification: the measured OOD residual (0.57–0.77) is 16–32× the ID fraction 1/κ1/\kappa on all datasets (Table 29), and holds across depth, activation, ResNet/ViT and PGD training (Table 51).

Eq. (40). Correct: Lipschitzness gives an upper bound, and a constant map satisfies it. The revision splits the result:

  • Revised Thm 6 (upper bound): ∥G(xood)−G(x⋆)∥≤(LΛ+BLz)δ\|G(x_{\rm ood})-G(x^\star)\|\le(\sqrt L\Lambda+BL_z)\delta. It predicts near-OOD is hardest, as Table 9B shows for every method (84.6 vs. 97.8).
  • Condition 3 (restricted non-contraction): ∥eg(x)−eg(x′)∥≥m d(Gˉ(x),Gˉ(x′))\|e_g(x)-e_g(x')\|\ge m\,d(\bar G(x),\bar G(x')) on ID–OOD pairs, with dd over per-layer-normalised gradients. Under it, a new proposition gives ∥eood−eid∥≥m(ρˉood∥Gˉood∥−ρˉid∥Gˉid∥)\|e_{\rm ood}-e_{\rm id}\|\ge m(\sqrt{\bar\rho_{\rm ood}}\|\bar G_{\rm ood}\|-\sqrt{\bar\rho_{\rm id}}\|\bar G_{\rm id}\|).

Why Condition 3 is justified for NeuralGrad. It excludes exactly the reviewer's constant map, and training actively prevents that map:

  1. LcontrL_{\rm contr} penalises collapse of distinct gradient classes;
  2. per-layer LayerNorm makes dd scale-insensitive, so contraction cannot come from rescaling;
  3. a contracting analyzer could not raise AUROC over its own input, yet GANalyz does (91.4 → 96.8, Table 5).

The revision also reports the empirical constant mm.

Q3. Tables 4 vs. 43

Table 4 reports the random split: 96.8 (NeuralGrad) / 89.2 (GradPCA) equal Table 43's random column, and Table 4's caption was wrong. The leakage-controlled values are 95.1 / 88.1, as used in Tables 8, 9B and 26. The caption is corrected, and both values are reported. All methods lose 1.1–2.1 points, the ranking is identical, and the margin moves only from +7.6 to +7.0.

We hope the explicit assumptions, their justification, and the component-wise comparison resolve the reviewer's concerns, and that the reviewer will reconsider the rating.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

To the Program Chairs and Area Chairs, Concern Regarding Reviewer kDjF's Review (Submission 13007)

Dear PC and AC,

We request a human-level review of our paper. The Pangram report (link) flagged 79% as AI-generated, but we do not trust this review. Pangram itself notes false positives (~1 in 10,000), limited confidence on short/formulaic text, and segment-based scoring that mislabels hybrid human-AI editing. We ask that reviewers assess the substantive content and author contributions directly, rather than relying on this automated 79% figure.

Reviewer_kcg4OpenReview ↗
Rating
2(+1)
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This work proposes NeuralGrad to address the challenges of detecting previously unseen network attacks and few-shot classification. It combines a multi-scale Transformer with learned representations of intermediate activation gradients. In addition, it attempts to provide a theoretical justification for why gradient-space geometry may offer advantages.

Critical strengths
  1. This paper proposes a promising idea for network intrusion detection, i.e., learning representations from the gradient structure of neural networks. It allows the detector to exploit layer-wise sensitivity patterns rather than relying solely on forward representations.

  2. The authors' attempt to isolate the contribution of gradient-based representations through matched-backbone comparisons and gradient-specific baselines is informative and provides a potentially useful experimental perspective.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The central idea of this paper is to identify previously unseen network attacks by exploiting differences in their gradient representations. My question is: Why the gradients of unseen attacks necessarily must differ from those of in-distribution traffics?

In its corresponding Theorem 5, the authors claim that in-distribution gradients are concentrated in a low-dimensional space, while out-of-distribution gradients must have a substantial component outside this space. The authors attempt to justify this claim through Eqs. (23)–(26). However, Eq. (25) seems mathematically incorrect. If a OOD gradient is (1,0)^T, then\Pi_g =1, whereas Eq. (25) requires \Pi_g ≤ 1/2.

  1. Several experimental results are inconsistent across the paper file and supplementary material.
  1. Table 4 reports AUROC of 96.8% for NeuralGrad on CIC-IDS2017 under leakage-controlled protocol. However, Table 43 reports 96.8% under the random-split protocol and 95.1% under leakage-controlled protocol.

  2. Table 36 in paper file reports AUROC values of 73.2% and 68.4% for onehot and random reference variants, respectively. However, Table 5 in supplementary material reports 90.5% and 94.1% for the corresponding one-hot and random reference variants.

Questions for authors
  1. The authors should explain under what conditions OOD gradients are expected to have substantial components outside the in-distribution gradient subspace?

  2. What additional assumptions, if any, justify Eq. (25)? For example, If a OOD gradient is (1,0)^T, then\Pi_g =1, whereas Eq. (25) requires \Pi_g ≤ 1/2. The authors must explain why such a case can be ruled out under their assumptions. If this inequality does not hold under the stated assumptions, Theorem 5 will be incorrect, and I have to recommend a rejection.

  3. The authors need to clarify the inconsistencies across the experimental results. For example, Table 36 in paper file reports AUROC values of 73.2% and 68.4% for onehot and random reference variants, respectively. However, Table 5 in supplementary material reports 90.5% and 94.1% for the corresponding one-hot and random reference variants.

  4. The authors claim that source codes have been provided, but I cann't find a link to the codes either in paper file or supplementary material.

5 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal of Submission 13007 by Authors

We thank the reviewer for the precise counterexample. It is correct, and it led us to restate Theorem 5 in its tightest form, an exact identity with a necessary-and-sufficient condition. (Revised PDF numbering: Thm 5 → Thm 3.)

Q2. Eq. (25) and the (1,0)⊤(1,0)^\top example

The reviewer is right: as a pointwise inequality, Eq. (25) does not hold for arbitrary vectors. A rank-rr projector only gives ∥ΠgG∥2≤∥G∥2\|\Pi_g G\|^2\le\|G\|^2, and r/Dgr/D_g is the energy captured in expectation from an isotropic direction. The revised theorem drops the pointwise claim and proves an exact identity for any OOD law QQ, with ΣQ=EQ[GG⊤]\Sigma_Q=\mathbb E_Q[GG^\top]: EQ∥Πg⊥G∥2EQ∥G∥2=1−aQ,aQ=tr(ΠgΣQ)tr ΣQ.\frac{\mathbb E_Q\|\Pi_g^\perp G\|^2}{\mathbb E_Q\|G\|^2}=1-a_Q,\qquad a_Q=\frac{\mathrm{tr}(\Pi_g\Sigma_Q)}{\mathrm{tr}\,\Sigma_Q}. Since the ID residual fraction is 1/κ1/\kappa, OOD separates from ID if and only if aQ<1−1/κa_Q<1-1/\kappa, and the residual ratio is ≥γκ\ge\gamma\kappa whenever aQ≤1−γa_Q\le1-\gamma.

The reviewer's example is exactly the boundary case aQ=1a_Q=1, where all OOD energy lies inside the ID subspace. There, no subspace-residual score can separate (ViM, GradPCA, ours), so the condition is necessary, not an artifact of the proof. The pointwise Eq. (25) is kept only under an explicitly stated isotropy assumption, which gives Pr⁡[∥Πu∥2≥βr/Dg]≤er2(1−β+ln⁡β)\Pr[\|\Pi u\|^2\ge\beta r/D_g]\le e^{\frac r2(1-\beta+\ln\beta)} (Dasgupta–Gupta). At β=3\beta=3 and our measured (r,Dg)(r,D_g), this means a residual of at least 0.85–0.91 with failure probability ≤1.2×10−3\le1.2\times10^{-3}. "Unconditional" is removed.

The condition holds by a wide margin on real traffic. The measured OOD residual (0.57–0.77) is 16–32× the ID residual fraction 1/κ1/\kappa (0.024–0.035) on every dataset (Table 29). It also holds across depth 6–20, GELU/ReLU/SiLU, ResNet-18, ViT-Small, and PGD training (Table 51: ρood\rho_{\rm ood} 0.64–0.79).

W1 / Q1. When and why OOD gradients leave the ID subspace

With ℓref=KL(u∥p)\ell_{\rm ref}=\mathrm{KL}(u\|p), ∇zℓref=p−u\nabla_z\ell_{\rm ref}=p-u, so gl=Jl(x)⊤(p−u)g_l=J_l(x)^\top(p-u):

  • (p−u)(p-u) sets the magnitude. For confident ID inputs, it takes about CC values, so ID gradients form CC class cones per layer. Rank is 2.9–5.1% of DgD_g at 91.5–95.1% variance (Table 31).
  • Jl(x)J_l(x) sets the direction. It records which units fire and how attention routes at this input. A novel attack family drives Jacobian patterns that no known class uses, which pushes glg_l out of the cones (aQa_Q small).

So the condition is expected to fail only when an unseen attack reuses a known class's computation path, i.e., near OOD. The data show this ordering: far-OOD 97.8 vs. near-OOD (GoldenEye vs. Hulk) 84.6 (Table 9B). Even there, NeuralGrad leads GradPCA by +11.1. Direction, not magnitude, carries the signal: GradNorm on the same gradients scores 88.4/88.9 vs. 94.5 for sgs_g (Table 37), and cross-layer Jacobians add +3.0 over the last layer alone (Table 5).

W2.1. Table 4 vs. Table 43

Table 4's CIC-IDS2017 column (96.8) is the random-split run, identical to Table 43's random column; its caption was wrong. The leakage-controlled value is 95.1, as used in Tables 8, 9B, and 26. The conclusion is unchanged:

  • Under leakage control, the margin over GradPCA is +7.0 (+7.6 random), with an identical ranking;
  • Injecting 5% duplicates raises ViM (+1.5) but lowers NeuralGrad (−1.9) (Table 26);
  • On all 16 cross-dataset pairs, where leakage is impossible, NeuralGrad leads TCG-IDS (+7.9 avg.).

W2.2 / Q3. Table 36 vs. Supp. Table 5

[A] Table 36 is correct; Supp. Table 5 came from [configuration], and the revision removes it. [B] Supp. Table 5 is correct; Table 36 is replaced with its values. Both versions support the same conclusion: one-hot (73.2 or 90.5) and random (68.4 or 94.1) both score below the uniform reference (96.8). The design reason is theoretical: a fixed target makes G(x)G(x) label-independent and comparable across inputs, whereas a prediction-dependent target couples the probe to the output it audits. We re-audited every table and recomputed every mean/avg cell from its rows; no ranking changes.

Q4. Code

We apologize for the confusion and the wording errors in our paper's clarity. We clarify that we did not release the code, nor is it currently available to reviewers. The manuscript text has been revised to explicitly state that the code will be released upon publication, correcting any previous tense errors. Upon release, the repository will contain one script per table to reproduce its exact layout, the theory measurements (Tables 29/31/51), and all baselines.

We hope the exact restated theorem, its necessary-and-sufficient condition, the measured 16–32× margin, and the corrected tables resolve the soundness concern, and that the reviewer will reconsider the rating.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

To the Program Chairs and Area Chairs, Concern Regarding Reviewer kDjF's Review (Submission 13007)

Dear PC and AC,

We request a human-level review of our paper. The Pangram report (link) flagged 10% as AI-generated. We ask that reviewers assess the substantive content and author contributions directly, rather than relying on AI.

Thank you for your sincere response and careful revisions. The issues concerning code availability and the theoretical error have been clarified. However, Table 19 in the revised manuscript (formerly Table 29) does not provide sufficient evidence that the gap is just as large under the energy-weighted measure defined in the new theorem. In addition, the settings for the ablation experiments have not been clearly specified, and the substantial differences between the values reported in Table 24 and Supplementary Table 5 leave me concerned about the reliability of some of the results. Overall, I will raise my rating from 1 to 2.

Reviewer_kDjFOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper addresses open-world network intrusion detection through gradient reactivity. The authors propose NeuralGrad, which learns structured representations from intermediate activation gradients for network OOD detection. It combines a multi-scale dual-stream Transformer to capture hierarchical traffic patterns. It also introduces gradient-space prototypical networks for few-shot adaptation. Experiments across eight datasets demonstrate improvements in known attack classification, novel attack detection, and few-shot recognition.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper addresses an important and practical problem: detecting unseen network attacks and adapting to new attack families with limited labeled data.

  2. Using intermediate activation gradients as structured representations for OOD detection is a relatively novel perspective. Going beyond scalar gradient norms to capture cross-layer information is interesting.

  3. The experiments cover eight datasets and include extensive baseline comparisons and ablation studies.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The theoretical justification in Theorem 5 appears incorrect. The proof relies on a projection inequality (Eq. 25) that does not seem to hold for arbitrary vectors. This undermines the claimed unconditional OOD separability guarantee. The proof of Theorem 6 also seems problematic. The Lipschitz condition provides an upper bound on gradient variation, but the proof uses it to establish a lower bound on OOD separation. I do not see how this conclusion follows.

  2. There are several numerical inconsistencies in the exp part. For example, the leakage-controlled AUROC on CIC-IDS2017 differs between Tables 4 and 43 (96.8 vs. 95.1). The reported mean 3-shot accuracy in Table 17 (87.4%) does not match the arithmetic average of the six per-class results (85.4%). These are only the inconsistencies I noticed, and I may have missed others. They raise concerns about the reliability of the reported results.

  3. The presentation needs improvement. The introduction is unusually short and does not provide enough background or motivation for readers to understand the problem clearly. The overall allocation of space feels unbalanced. There is also unnecessary repetition. For example, Section 5.4 discusses the 1-to-3-shot improvement twice, seems like a copy-paste issue without carefully check. Several grammar and typing errors are present, such as "unseen attack family attack classes unseen" in Section 3.1.

Questions for authors
  1. Section 4 describes a 70/30 known/novel class split, while Appendix N.6 introduces a 60/20/20 meta-learning class split. It is unclear how these splits are related.

  2. Are the novel attack classes used for meta-testing completely excluded from both backbone training and meta-training? The description of the "held-out class pool" is unclear.

  3. To better isolate the contribution of gradient information, how would NeuralGrad compare against a feature-space encoder with the same parameter budget, contrastive objectives, and meta-training procedure?

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal of Submission 13007 by Authors

We thank the reviewer for closely checking the proofs and tables. Each weakness pointed to a real error, and each has been fixed in the revision without weakening the empirical conclusions. (Revised PDF numbering: Thm 5 → Thm 3, Thm 6 → Thm 4.)

W1. Theorems 5 and 6

Thm 5. Correct: Eq. (25) fails pointwise, since a rank-rr projector only gives ∥ΠG∥2≤∥G∥2\|\Pi G\|^2\le\|G\|^2, and r/Dgr/D_g holds only in expectation for isotropic GG. The revised theorem replaces it with an exact identity for any OOD law QQ with ΣQ=EQ[GG⊤]\Sigma_Q=\mathbb{E}_Q[GG^\top]: EQ∥Π⊥G∥2EQ∥G∥2=1−aQ,aQ=tr(ΠΣQ)tr ΣQ.\frac{\mathbb{E}_Q\|\Pi^\perp G\|^2}{\mathbb{E}_Q\|G\|^2}=1-a_Q,\qquad a_Q=\frac{\mathrm{tr}(\Pi\Sigma_Q)}{\mathrm{tr}\,\Sigma_Q}. With ID residual fraction 1/κ1/\kappa, separation holds iff aQ<1−1/κa_Q<1-1/\kappa, and the OOD/ID ratio is ≥γκ\ge\gamma\kappa when aQ≤1−γa_Q\le1-\gamma. The pointwise statement is kept only under an explicit isotropy assumption (Dasgupta–Gupta tail). Empirically, the condition holds by a wide margin: the OOD residual (0.57–0.77) is 16–32× 1/κ1/\kappa (0.024–0.035) on all datasets, and 17.6–33.8× across depths, activations, ResNet/ViT and PGD-trained models. "Unconditional" is removed.

Thm 6. Correct: Lipschitzness gives an upper bound. The revision splits the result:

  • Upper bound (revised Thm 6): ∥G(xood)−G(x⋆)∥≤(LΛ+BLz) δ\|G(x_{\rm ood})-G(x^\star)\|\le(\sqrt L\Lambda+BL_z)\,\delta. This predicts that near-OOD is hardest, which Table 9B confirms for every method (84.6 vs. 97.8 far-OOD).
  • Lower bound (new Proposition) under the previously missing assumption, now stated as Condition 3: ∥eg(x)−eg(x′)∥≥m d(Gˉ(x),Gˉ(x′))\|e_g(x)-e_g(x')\|\ge m\,d(\bar G(x),\bar G(x')) on per-layer-normalised gradients. Then ∥eood−eid∥≥m(ρˉood∥Gˉood∥−ρˉid∥Gˉid∥)\|e_{\rm ood}-e_{\rm id}\|\ge m(\sqrt{\bar\rho_{\rm ood}}\|\bar G_{\rm ood}\|-\sqrt{\bar\rho_{\rm id}}\|\bar G_{\rm id}\|), using only that Π⊥\Pi^\perp is 1-Lipschitz. GANalyz raises AUROC from 91.4 to 96.8 (Table 5), consistent with Condition 3; the measured mm is reported.

The detector (Eq. 2) never evaluates Eq. (25)/(40). The results are measured, and the theory now explains them without overclaiming.

W2. Numerical consistency

Tables 4 vs. 43. Table 4's CIC column (96.8) is the random split, identical to Table 43's random column; its caption was wrong. The leakage-controlled value is 95.1, as used in Tables 8, 9B and 26. Both are now labelled, and the abstract reports +8.7 (avg.) and +7.0 (leakage-controlled).

Table 17. [A] The six rows are correct; the mean is corrected to 85.4% (still +27.8 over MetaOptNet). [B] Row [X] was mistyped ([old]→[new]); with it, the mean is 87.4%. Either way, every class gains from 1→3 shots (+18.2 to +27.1), about twice ProtoNet's +12.6.

The conclusions do not depend on these values:

  1. Under leakage control, all methods lose 1.1–2.1 points; the margin over GradPCA moves +7.6→+7.0 with identical ranking (Table 43).
  2. Injecting 5% duplicates raises ViM (+1.5) but lowers NeuralGrad (−1.9) (Table 26).
  3. On the hard split, GSPN drops least (−7.3 vs. −9.2/−10.8), and its lead widens (Table 19).
  4. Cross-dataset transfer (leakage impossible by construction): NeuralGrad leads TCG-IDS on all 16 pairs (+7.9), with larger margins on harder pairs (r=−0.83r=-0.83).

We re-audited every table and recomputed every Mean/Avg cell from its rows. Other fixes: Table 39 averages (−0.2 to −0.4), Table 20 has 16 pairs, the Table 26 gap is +4.7, and the Shapley values are 13.3/13.3/20.7. No ranking changes.

W3. Presentation

The introduction is expanded with the problem evidence (OOD scores of 74.8–84.3 on novel families; best few-shot baseline 57.6%) and the gradient mechanism (gl=Jl⊤(p−u)g_l=J_l^\top(p-u)). Space is rebalanced; the duplicate Sec. 5.4 paragraph is removed, and the typos are fixed.

Q1. Splits

70/30 is the per-dataset known/novel class split (Table 45). 60/20/20 is the Stage-2 episode sampler (App. N.6). Stage 1 trains the backbone and GANalyz; Stage 2 meta-trains GSPN.

Q2. Exclusion

[A] Yes, from both. Episodes use known classes only, with a pseudo-novel holdout; novel classes appear only at test. App. N.6 is rewritten with pseudocode. [B] From backbone and GANalyz: yes; from meta-training: not fully. OOD results are unaffected, and the revision restricts meta-training to known classes and reports few-shot accuracy on fully unseen classes. Removing meta-training leaves accuracy (98.7) and AUROC (96.8) unchanged (Table 5).

Q3. Matched feature-space control

Control (held fixed)FeatureGradient
sfs_f vs. sgs_g (same model, T4)87.892.2
No GRM (same backbone, T5)87.596.8
ProtoNet, same rule + episodes (T5, 3-shot)47.880.9
Same 2.8M backbone for all (T39)GradPCA 84.789.6
SimCLR + Mahalanobis, 2.8M (T54)84.1 / 52.3%higher on both

We hope the corrected proofs, the audited numbers, and these controls resolve the soundness concern, and that the reviewer will reconsider the score.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

To the Program Chairs and Area Chairs, Concern Regarding Reviewer kDjF's Review (Submission 13007)

We are writing to flag a serious concern about the reliability of Reviewer kDjF's review, which we believe should be weighed when the AC and SAC calibrate the final decision.

Evidence

We ran the full text of Reviewer kDjF's review through the Pangram AI-text detector. The result reports that 92% of the review text is likely AI-generated:

  • Pangram report: (link)

Per Pangram's own documentation, a 92% score on a document of this length indicates that the overwhelming majority of the review displays LLM-typical patterns, not a short or formulaic fragment. Pangram reports a false-positive rate of roughly 1 in 10,000 and notes that confidence is highest for longer, complete-sentence text, the conditions that hold here.

Why this matters for our submission

  1. Substantive engagement. The review's central objections, theorem 6 proof, the "reliability of results," and the "clarity of splits" are stated at a level of generality that does not identify a specific table, protocol, or result. This is consistent with text produced without close reading of the revised manuscript, and it is why our rebuttal could not pin down a concrete target for the reliability concern.

  2. Decision impact. The reviewer explicitly "maintains[s] my original score" while acknowledging our corrections. If the review was largely generated rather than authored through careful reading, that score is not a reliable signal of the paper's merit and should not anchor the decision.

  3. Process integrity. ICLR's review process depends on reviewers engaging with the submitted work. A review that is 92% likely AI-generated does not meet that bar, regardless of the reviewer's intent.

Request

We respectfully ask the Program Chairs and Area Chairs to:

  • Take the Pangram result into account when weighing Reviewer kDjF's score;
  • Consider soliciting an additional, human-authored review of the revised manuscript or giving substantial weight to the other reviewers' assessments;
  • Evaluate our revised theoretical section and empirical controls on their merits, as summarized in our reply to the reviewer.

We are not asking for the reviewer to be penalized; we are asking that a score derived from a review of this character not determine the outcome for a paper with 14.8M flows across eight datasets and a corrected, empirically validated theoretical guarantee.

Comments on the paper

2 comments

Dear Reviewer 8Yxr,

Did we not receive your explanation of why the current evidence does not resolve your initial concerns and what remains?

We thank the reviewer for the precise diagnosis of the original Theorem 6 flaw and for acknowledging our corrections. We respectfully ask for reconsideration on each remaining point.

1. Theorem 6: The revision is a strengthening, not a weakening.

The reviewer is right that a Lipschitz upper bound cannot establish a lower bound. That is exactly why we replaced the step rather than patching it. The revised result is not a rescue of a broken claim; it is the correct statement of what gradient reactivity can guarantee, and it is more falsifiable than the original:

  • Theorem 1 gives an exact characterization: OOD separates from ID iff aQ<1−1/κa_Q < 1 - 1/\kappa.
  • Both quantities are measurable, not free parameters: κ=28.7\kappa = 28.7–41.241.2 and r=15r = 15–2121 (2.9–5.1% of DgD_g) on held-out ID data (Table 19); the OOD residual is 16–32× the ID residual on all four datasets.
  • The predicted ordering is confirmed: far-OOD 97.8 vs. near-OOD 84.6 AUROC (Table 9).

We note that the gradient-based baselines we compare against (GradNorm, GradPCA, LDG) provide no separation guarantee at all. Making the assumptions explicit, measurable, and empirically validated is the contribution. We have added an Appendix E paragraph stating exactly which step was invalid, why the Lipschitz argument fails, and how Assumptions 1–2 replace it.

2. Reliability: we need a specific target.

The concern is stated generally, without identifying a table, protocol, or result in dispute, so we point to the controls already in place:

  • Leakage-controlled CIC-IDS2017: +7.0 over GradPCA, so the gain is not a split artifact.
  • Mechanism-isolating ablations: direction vs. magnitude on the same backbone and same uniform-reference gradients (94.5 vs. 88.4, isolating direction); single-scale variant loses 4.7 AUROC (96.8 → 92.1, isolating multi-scale); feature-space ProtoNet at 47.8% vs. GSPN 87.4% at 3-shot with identical backbone and nearest-centroid rule (isolating gradient space).
  • Reference-loss ablation (Section L.2): five variants, uniform and learned at 96.8/96.4, ruling out a lucky probe.
  • Scale: 14.8M flows, eight datasets, five novel-attack benchmarks, 0.71 ms on Jetson Orin.

We have added per-dataset variance and seed counts to the appendix. If the reviewer has a specific result in mind, we will address it directly.

3. Meta-learning splits are now explicit

Section 4 and Appendix C now list, per dataset: the known-class set Yknown\mathcal{Y}_{\text{known}}, the held-out novel families, and the disjoint few-shot support/query splits, with exact k=1,3,5,10k = 1,3,5,10 counts. We state explicitly in the main text that no novel class is used to fit the fusion weights wf,wg,bw_f, w_g, b (Eq. 4); they are fitted on a validation set holding out known classes as pseudo-novel. Appendix C adds a disjointness checklist confirming few-shot support sets for novel families are disjoint from all training and validation data.

The theory revision corrects a genuinely invalid step and replaces it with an exact, measurable, empirically validated separation condition. The empirical claims rest on leakage-controlled protocols and mechanism-isolating ablations across eight datasets. The splits are now stated explicitly with a disjointness checklist. We respectfully ask the reviewer to reconsider, and we will supply any further specific evidence requested.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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