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Paper summary
This paper first shows that output-based verification in machine unlearning can be fooled. The paper presents an attack, output-level deceptive response (ODR) to prove the vulnerability. Specifically, the paper shows ODR in two learning scenarios ODR-Head for class unlearning and ODR-Gate for sample unlearning. The attacks pass output-based verifiers even though the original backbone of the model remains intact. Then, the paper proposes RUV framework based on four views: activation route shift, representation shift, neighborhood persistence gap, and manifold rank drop. The proposed verification framework is gray-box unlike previous black-box methods (vulnerable to ODR) and white-box (requires full access, not practical). The proposed gray-box settings require only forward representation, not parameters, not gradients. Experiments are carried out on CIFAR10/100 and FaceScrub with ResNet models and RUV shows good performance. The paper also presents results ViT-S/16 and MobileNetV2 for applicability in different architectures.
Critical strengths
The paper shows attack and fix together with a more realistic threat model. ODR shows output statistics are weak and covers both class and sample request. Three requirements of RUV (attribution, coverage, and calibration) are useful. The four views follow a coherent story (route, state, neighborhood, manifold). The threat model does not require parameter nor gradient access. Evaluation scope covers exact and approximate unlearning, class and sample requests, several datasets and architectures. Experiments also include ablations for each component.
Critical weaknesses
The claims are a bit broad. The related work says outside machine unlearning verification, there are works on representation analysis. There are works on early to mid of this year inside machine unlearning.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.27569
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.25001
https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.06991
https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.18505
Classifier only fine-tuning (illusion of unleanring, https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.08271) is similar to ODR-Head. Really unlearned (https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10953) invades MIA-based verification for sample unlearning which is similar to ODR-Gate. Very recent works may be parallel to the paper. But earlier papers may overlap with the paper. In addition, I think it is better to compare the propose method with RULER.
Although the proposed threat model is more realistic, it still assume a trusted extraction channel. I think it may be difficult to comply with the provider because the provide may not want to reveal any part of the model information. The representation may reflect the model information. Experiments are only on small models and datasets. How about ImageNet or large models?
Questions for authors
Will RUV still work for large models and datasets?
What are the limitations of the proposed method?
5 comments
Response to Weakness — (2)
2. Studies Related to ODR
(1) Gao et al. (2026) [5]
This work primarily investigates class-level unlearning. Through feature–classifier mismatch analysis and classifier-only fine-tuning, it reveals discrepancies between output behavior and retained internal discriminative information.
This construction is directly related to ODR-Head, as explicitly acknowledged in our revision. Our work further examines two manipulation strategies: classification-head modification (ODR-Head) and service-response replacement (ODR-Gate). Together, they cover class-level and sample-level requests and evaluate multiple output-level verifiers without representation-level parameter updates.
(2) Xu et al. (2026) [6]
This work demonstrates bypasses of MIA-based and backdoor-based verification through fine-tuning and proposes a verifier based on influential sample pairs. Its MIA bypass makes target outputs resemble those of same-class nonmembers, sharing ODR-Gate's motivation.
However, Xu et al. achieve output alignment through parameter fine-tuning, whereas ODR-Gate directly returns same-class nonmember posteriors for registered target queries without updating model parameters.
Combined with class-level ODR-Head, ODR-Gate enables a unified investigation of output-verifier manipulability across both unlearning request types.
[1] Georgina Cosma and Axel Finke. RULER: Representation-Level Verification of Machine Unlearning. arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.27569, 2026. DOI.
[2] Teresa Pui Yee Yong, Win Kent Ong, and Chee Seng Chan. Erased, but Not Gone: Output Forgetting Is Not True Forgetting. arXiv preprint arXiv:2606.25001, 2026. DOI.
[3] Yongwoo Kim, Sungmin Cha, and Donghyun Kim. Are We Truly Forgetting? A Critical Re-examination of Machine Unlearning Evaluation Protocols. Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 167:113785, 2026. DOI.
[4] Yurim Jang, Jaeung Lee, Dohyun Kim, Jaemin Jo, and Simon S. Woo. Suppression or Deletion: A Restoration-Based Representation-Level Analysis of Machine Unlearning. Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026, pages 8505–8508, 2026. DOI.
[5] Yichen Gao, Altay Unal, Akshay Rangamani, and Zhihui Zhu. An Illusion of Unlearning? Assessing Machine Unlearning Through Internal Representations. Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, PMLR 300:4114–4122, 2026. PMLR.
[6] Heng Xu, Tianqing Zhu, Lefeng Zhang, and Wanlei Zhou. Really Unlearned? Verifying Machine Unlearning via Influential Sample Pairs. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 23(1):1671–1686, 2026. DOI.
Regarding the Threat Model
Thank you for raising the practical deployment concerns. We clarify the following points.
(1). Trusted representation extraction and the auditing setting.
Our original submission explicitly assumes that the extraction interface faithfully returns intermediate representations produced by the submitted model. This is a fundamental assumption of RUV.
We consider controlled audits where authorized auditors have limited forward access. Providers need not publicly expose representations, parameters, gradients, or training logs to ordinary users.
Services offering no internal representation access fall outside this setting, leaving verification dependent on output-level evidence, whose unreliability our work demonstrates.
(2). Relationship to the access assumptions of existing representation-based verification methods.
RUV follows the fundamental assumptions of existing representation-based verification methods while requiring more restricted access. Unlike white-box methods requiring model parameters, detailed architectures, or backward computations, RUV audits through a forward representation interface. With trusted extraction, it provides internal verification evidence with fewer access privileges and without independently retrained reference models.
(3). Privacy risks and practical deployment limitations.
We acknowledge that gray-box access may introduce privacy risks through exposure of representations and model information. Our auditing setting restricts access to authorized parties rather than a public representation interface. Practical deployment therefore requires safeguards such as access control.
Furthermore, extraction-channel authentication, consistency between audited and deployed models, and protection of representation privacy are complementary requirements beyond RUV's statistical decision mechanism.
These assumptions and limitations are consolidated in Section 7 (Discussion) of the revised manuscript.
Response to Q1 and Q2
Response to Q1:
Thank you for your suggestion. We agree that dataset and model scale can affect the generalizability of our conclusions.
To further evaluate the scalability of RUV, we have conducted additional experiments on the ImageNet-1K dataset with the ResNet-152 architecture, using Retraining and SCRUB to examine exact retraining and approximate unlearning, respectively. The experimental protocol is provided in Appendix E.6, with detailed results presented in Appendix G.4 and Tables 12–13.
The experimental results show that RUV maintains good verification performance in this larger-scale image classification setting, providing further empirical evidence of its applicability to larger datasets and deeper convolutional models. Specifically, RUV accepts Retraining at 0.989/0.952 and SCRUB at 0.948/0.918 for class-level/sample-level requests; SCRUB's forgotten-class accuracy and sample-level LiRA attack accuracy are 0.011 and 0.506, respectively.
Response to Q2:
Thank you for your suggestion. We agree that explicitly acknowledging the limitations of our method helps clarify its applicability boundaries and guide future research. Therefore, we have added a new Discussion subsection in Section 7 of the revised manuscript to discuss the limitations of our method and potential directions for future work. The main points are summarized as follows.
1. Application Scenarios. RUV is currently designed and evaluated primarily for image classification tasks and cannot be directly generalized to generative settings, particularly those involving large language models (LLMs). Such tasks differ in their output formats, definitions of target information, and construction of reference data. Further research is needed to investigate appropriate evidence views and calibration strategies for these settings.
2. Privacy Risks of Representation Access. Internal representations provide richer evidence for unlearning verification, but they also introduce potential information leakage risks, such as being exploited for model inversion or data reconstruction. Our work adopts a restricted-access setting intended for authorized auditors. However, this arrangement does not itself provide a privacy guarantee. Developing internal auditing approaches that integrate access control and privacy-preserving mechanisms remains an important direction for future research.
3. Trusted Representation Extraction Assumption. RUV assumes that the representation extraction interface faithfully returns the actual intermediate representations produced by the submitted model. Services that provide no internal access do not satisfy this assumption. Moreover, authentication of the extraction channel and consistency between the audited model and the model actually deployed require additional supporting mechanisms.
4. Detectability and Decision Boundaries. When the influence of target records is small, or when legitimate unlearning does not alter the audited representations, RUV may fail to obtain sufficient response evidence. Furthermore, its decisions are based on the statistical responses of the target group and therefore cannot confirm that every individual record in the unlearning request has been successfully unlearned. Improving detection capabilities for small-scale unlearning requests and developing more fine-grained auditing methods are important directions for future investigation.
Response to Weakness — (1)
Thank you for your interest in and recognition of our work.
Regarding Related Work
We have expanded the discussion of the six studies you mentioned and other relevant work to clarify our contributions. Please refer to Sections 1–2 and Appendix A for details. Our analysis follows.
1. Studies Related to RUV
(1) RULER [1]
Compared with RUV, RULER raises concerns about the reliability of output-level verification and analyzes them using its proposed metrics. However, it does not implement concrete deceptive attacks comparable to ODR.
RULER's M2 already uses retained records for calibration, while M4 constructs an internal reference based on the nearest-neighbor distribution of the retained set. Therefore, RUV's distinction does not simply lie in its use of retained data. Instead, RUV integrates multi-view responses between the original and unlearned models, matched retained-data controls, and request-specific joint decisions that preserve dependencies among the evidence views.
Among RULER's four verification metrics, three (M1, M2, and M3) rely on Retraining, while only M4 does not. However, the authors explicitly acknowledge that M4 is a preliminary attempt and exhibits strong dataset dependence, with degraded verification performance in other settings.
We therefore include retraining-free RULER-M4 as an additional baseline. We follow the datasets, model architectures, class-level and sample-level unlearning requests, and submitted models used in our main experiments. Following the official implementation, we extract representations immediately before the classification head and compute M4. An acceptance interval centered at 0.5 is determined in advance using independent calibration requests. We consistently report acceptance rates of different unlearning methods and rejection rates of ODR.
The results show that M4 has difficulty distinguishing Original from Retraining under certain sample-level requests. Moreover, because ODR introduces no backbone update, its preclassifier M4 statistic matches that of Original, resulting in false acceptance. Under class-level requests, semantic differences between the target and retained classes affect M4's verification results, leading to false rejection of correct Retraining submissions. For example, under CIFAR10 sample-level requests, the acceptance rates of Original and Retraining are 0.876 and 0.883, while the ODR rejection rate is only 0.124; under CIFAR100 class-level requests, the acceptance rate of correct Retraining is only 0.613.
(2) Yong et al. (2026) [2]
This work constructs a reference distribution using independently retrained models to analyze discrepancies between output-level forgetting and representation-level consistency with retraining. It also investigates information recovery through diagnostics such as relearning. Its empirical analysis focuses on class-level unlearning.
In contrast, RUV does not require constructing an ensemble of retrained reference models and supports both class-level and sample-level requests. It makes request-level verification decisions through matched retained-data controls and joint calibration. Although this work also highlights the unreliability of output-level verification, it does not propose a concrete implementation of deception comparable to ODR.
(3) Kim et al. (2026) [3]
This work combines output-level metrics, representational similarity, and downstream transferability in large-scale settings, revealing that some unlearning methods merely modify the classifier or degrade representation quality. It also establishes a unified evaluation framework. However, its evaluation primarily focuses on class-level unlearning and relies on comparisons with retrained models.
In contrast, RUV focuses on post-hoc auditing without requiring an independently retrained reference model, while supporting both class-level and sample-level requests. Although this work also identifies the unreliability of output-level verification, it does not implement concrete deceptive attacks comparable to ODR.
(4) Jang et al. (2026) [4]
This work employs sparse autoencoders to identify class-related features and performs inference-time feature interventions to examine whether target knowledge can be recovered, thereby distinguishing representational suppression from information removal. Although its restoration-based analysis does not require retraining, it primarily addresses class-level unlearning.
In contrast, RUV supports both class-level and sample-level requests without training sparse autoencoders or performing feature interventions. Instead, it audits forward representational responses of the original and submitted models. Although this work also raises concerns about the reliability of output-level verification, it does not implement concrete deceptive attacks comparable to ODR.