- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper demonstates a potential privacy issue in today's prototype-based federated learning, and proposes accordingly an attacking framework along with the defense methods.
Critical strengths
- This work provides a solid background discussion and sufficient coverage of related work. The structure is clear, and the research problem is well formulated.
- The illustrations and figures are easy to read and helpful. The experiments are comprehensive.
- The paper clearly introduces DPP as a defense method against the proposed attack.
- The ablation study is detailed and helps clarify the contribution of each design component.
Critical weaknesses
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The proposed attack is evaluated under a typical non-IID setting, while the authors do not clearly specify whether it also works in more IID cases. I understand that non-IID settings are the main attack target here, but I suggest that the authors state the applicable boundary more clearly.
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The paper attributes the observed angular divergence signals to label distribution shift. However, I think similar signals may also come from other types of client heterogeneity. Would it be possible to include experiments under such settings? This would help clarify the scope and assumptions of the paper.
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Based on the comments above, the scope of DPP may still be somewhat limited to these specific attack settings. This is, however, a relatively minor limitation.
Questions for authors
I do not have specific questions. Please see Critical Weaknesses.
4 comments
I thank the author for the rebuttal materials, and they have mostly addressed my concerns. I remain my original positive score.
We thank the reviewer again for the positive assessment. The reviewer’s comments helped us improve our work, and we will incorporate the additional results and clarifications into the final version.
We have now updated the PDF once again to reflect the discussion with the reviewers, with new changes in green and those from the previous revision in blue. In the final version, we will further reorganize the paper to fully incorporate the discussion. We hope this addresses the reviewers' concerns; please let us know if you have any further questions. Thank you for your valuable feedback.
We sincerely appreciate the reviewer’s positive and constructive review. In the revised PDF, all changes are highlighted in blue, and we refer to them by page and line numbers throughout our responses.
W1. Applicable boundary of PLIA. We thank the reviewer for this insightful suggestion. We evaluate PLIA and DPP under α∈0.1,0.5,1,5,10,20 and the IID setting on HAR, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet (Figure 9 in Appendix J, p. 20; summarized in Section 5.2, p. 8, L417--419). PLIA achieves clearly lower LDL$^{\mathrm{TV}}$ than the Uniform baseline under non-IID settings (α≤1), while its advantage diminishes as α increases and disappears in the IID setting, where local label distributions are nearly uniform, and the Uniform baseline is already accurate. Thus, PLIA applies to non-IID settings, which are typical in FL and where label distributions carry meaningful private information. DPP maintains higher LDL$^{\mathrm{TV}}$ than the Uniform baseline in most settings.
W2. Other types of client heterogeneity. We thank the reviewer for this helpful suggestion. 1) We have considered model heterogeneity, where clients use different architectures, and PLIA (Hete.) in Table 1 outperforms the Random and Uniform baselines in all cases (LDL$^{\mathrm{SC}}$ of 0.331--0.860 vs. 0.000 for Random). 2) Following the reviewer's suggestion, we further evaluate PLIA and DPP under domain shift on Digit-5 with 20 clients under FedProto, where clients hold either all five domains (mixed) or a single domain, both with Dir(0.5) labels (table below). PLIA achieves lower LDL$^{\mathrm{TV}}$ than the Uniform baseline in both settings, and DPP substantially increases LDL$^{\mathrm{TV}}$ with negligible accuracy change. We will add these results to the appendix. PLIA targets label distribution skew and assumes uniform sampling and individually uploaded prototypes without secure aggregation.
PLIA and DPP under domain shift on Digit-5 (FedProto, λ=1, Dir(0.5) labels).
Domain splitAll five domains per clientSingle domain per clientMethodUniformPLIA (No Defense)PLIA (DPP)UniformPLIA (No Defense)PLIA (DPP)TV↑0.4300.2370.5510.3530.1760.508Acc.↑−85.986.0−91.090.9
W3. Scope of DPP. We thank the reviewer for the understanding. We agree that DPP's scope is currently limited to the angular leakage that PLIA exploits, as it is the first attack on shared prototypes and existing attacks target parameter-sharing FL, leaving no other prototype-based attack to evaluate against. We have stated this scope explicitly as a limitation in Section 6 of the revised PDF (p. 10, L517--519), and we view extending DPP to broader prototype-based threats as an important direction for future work.