acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

ZKLLMPOT: EFFICIENT ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOF OF TRAINING FOR LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

Abstract

Auditing the claimed outcomes of large language model (LLM) training is challenging when model weights and training data are private, while cryptographically proving the full training process is prohibitively expensive at Transformer scale. We present zkLLMPoT, a zero-knowledge framework that certifies auditor-defined properties of a trained checkpoint through forward evaluation rather than verification of its optimization trajectory. zkLLMPoT includes 2 phases: 1) The trainer fixes the architecture and the model weights are committed. Then the auditor selects challenge sequences, preventing the trainer from modifying the checkpoint in response to the audit data. 2) Then the trainer proves the objective value attained by the committed model on those sequences. This formulation makes the certification cost independent of the number of training iterations, without revealing model weights or requiring access to private training data. We build on sumcheck- and lookup-based arguments to certify Transformer computations, while supporting next-token loss and task-specific audit objectives. Across four model families, operator-level benchmarks yield proving times of 41–59 seconds for 1.1–1.5B-parameter models and 131 seconds at 13B for the covered operators, with estimated verification below half a second at a sequence length of 512.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
zero-knowledge proofs, proof of training, large language models, model auditing

Reviews

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1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_rQPjOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper presents zkLLMPoT, a zero-knowledge framework for auditing properties of a committed LLM checkpoint without proving the full optimization trajectory. The trainer commits to the model architecture and weights before the auditor selects challenge sequences, after which the prover certifies an auditor-defined scalar objective v=L(fA,θ(S))v = L(f_{A,\theta}(S)). The protocol combines polynomial commitments, sumcheck-based arguments for linear Transformer operations, lookup arguments for nonlinear operations, and a commit-then-challenge ordering intended to prevent post-hoc adaptation to the audit set.

A key design choice is to exclude backpropagation and optimizer updates from the proved relation, making the cost independent of the number of training iterations. The paper benchmarks individual operators on an A100 and aggregates these measurements for several OPT, Llama, Qwen2.5, and DeepSeek-Coder configurations. It reports estimated proving times of 41--59 seconds for 1.1--1.5B models and 131 seconds for a 13B configuration at sequence length 512, with estimated verification below 0.5 seconds.

Critical strengths

This paper presents zkLLMPoT, a zero-knowledge framework for auditing properties of a committed LLM checkpoint without proving the full optimization trajectory. The trainer commits to the model architecture and weights before the auditor selects challenge sequences, after which the prover certifies an auditor-defined scalar objective v=L(fA,θ(S))v = L(f_{A,\theta}(S)). The protocol combines polynomial commitments, sumcheck-based arguments for linear Transformer operations, lookup arguments for nonlinear operations, and a commit-then-challenge ordering intended to prevent post-hoc adaptation to the audit set.

A key design choice is to exclude backpropagation and optimizer updates from the proved relation, making the certification cost independent of the number of training iterations. The paper benchmarks individual operators on an A100 and aggregates these measurements according to several OPT, Llama, Qwen2.5, and DeepSeek-Coder configurations. It reports estimated proving times of 41--59 seconds for 1.1--1.5B models and 131 seconds for a 13B configuration at sequence length 512, with estimated verification below 0.5 seconds.

Critical weaknesses

1. The certified statement appears closer to zero-knowledge model evaluation than to proof of training, which makes both the novelty claim and the main baseline comparison difficult to interpret.

zkLLMPoT proves that a committed checkpoint attains an objective LL on post-commit challenge sequences; it does not establish that this checkpoint was produced using the claimed training data, learning algorithm, or optimization trajectory. In particular, a checkpoint obtained through an entirely different process could apparently satisfy the same relation.

This distinction matters because Table 1 primarily compares zkLLMPoT against systems that certify substantially stronger statements about the training process. Therefore, an important part of the efficiency improvement follows directly from changing the statement being proved rather than only from making the same proof substantially more efficient.

I would like to see a sharper comparison against LLM forward/inference proof systems such as zkLLM and zkGPT, together with a precise explanation of what additional guarantee zkLLMPoT provides beyond privacy-preserving evaluation of a committed model. The novelty discussion should also distinguish this work from prior approaches that similarly avoid proving the full optimization trajectory by instead certifying properties of the final model, for example, Founding Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training on Optimum Vicinity (CCS 2025). Extending this general direction to Transformer-scale LLMs may still be an important contribution, but the current positioning makes it difficult to isolate exactly what conceptual advance should be attributed to zkLLMPoT.

2. The central scalability and practicality claims are supported by aggregated operator-level estimates rather than an end-to-end proof on a real LLM checkpoint.

The reported experiments use synthetic fixed-point tensors and aggregate measured operator costs according to model dimensions. The resulting 41--59 second and 131 second numbers are therefore modeled end-to-end costs rather than measurements of complete executions of the proposed auditing protocol on the corresponding LLM checkpoints.

Moreover, the protocol proves computation using an integer-quantized copy of the weights, but I did not find an empirical analysis of the discrepancy between the objective certified by this fixed-point computation and the objective produced by the original checkpoint. This is particularly relevant when the certified scalar is compared against an acceptance threshold: a small numerical approximation error could in principle change the audit decision for examples close to the boundary.

Because practical Transformer-scale auditing is a central contribution of the paper, at least one end-to-end run on a real checkpoint, together with a quantitative analysis of fixed-point fidelity and the complete system cost, would materially increase my confidence in the claimed practicality.

Questions for authors

Q1. What exactly is the security/audit claim that justifies describing zkLLMPoT as a proof of training rather than a proof of a property of a trained checkpoint?

Suppose a trainer obtains θ\theta through a completely different training procedure, or does not use the claimed private training data at all, but the committed θ\theta nevertheless satisfies L(fA,θ(S))L(f_{A,\theta}(S)) on the auditor's post-commit challenges. Would zkLLMPoT accept in this case?

If so, my understanding is that the certificate establishes a property of the final checkpoint, but not that the checkpoint was obtained through the claimed training process. Could the authors clarify the exact guarantee and explain what zkLLMPoT certifies beyond zero-knowledge evaluation of a committed model? This distinction would materially affect how I interpret both the contribution and the comparison with prior proof-of-training systems.

Q2. Can the authors provide at least one actual end-to-end proof run on a real checkpoint and clarify which costs are included in the reported estimates?

In particular, I would like to know the total prover wall-clock time, verifier time, peak CPU/GPU memory, communication/proof size, per-audit activation-commitment cost, and any opening or proof-preparation costs.

I would also like to see the objective evaluated by the original checkpoint compared with the objective produced by the fixed-point/quantized circuit. How large is this discrepancy in practice, and can quantization ever change an accept/reject decision for a value close to the acceptance boundary?

An end-to-end measurement and this fidelity analysis would materially affect my assessment of the paper's practical scalability claim.

Q3. Is the final protocol interactive or non-interactive and transferable?

Section 2.1 describes the construction in terms of a zk-SNARK, while Algorithm 2 presents sumcheck rounds in which the verifier samples and sends fresh challenges. I did not find a description of a Fiat--Shamir transformation or another mechanism that converts these interactions into a non-interactive transferable proof.

If Fiat--Shamir is used in the final protocol, could the authors specify how the transcript and challenges are derived, state the corresponding assumptions, and clarify whether the associated proof-size and runtime costs are included in the reported results?

If the implemented protocol instead remains interactive, then I think the claims concerning a transferable proof object, as well as the comparison with interactive baselines, need to be clarified. The answer could materially affect my assessment of the protocol and its reported system properties.

Reviewer_rZZpOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
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Paper summary

The authors use a commit-then-prove approach to prove the inference process of an LLM and related safety properties with zero-knowledge proofs. For the different computation components in LLMs, they use sumcheck for linear layers, logUp lookups for activations and normalization, and mixed-radix digit-decomposed lookups for softmax, which implement the zero-knowledge proof and improve its efficiency. The paper provides runtime efficiency experiments on 14 configurations from 4 model families, ranging from 0.125B to 13B parameters.

Critical strengths

The authors prove the inference process of LLMs and use sumcheck, logUp lookups, digit-decomposed softmax lookups, and Hyrax-style commitments to efficiently prove nonlinear and other computation components.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The contributions are overstated and the novelty is insufficient. The work is essentially a proof of inference: it proves that a trained model has certain safety properties, which is not a proof of training. Commit-then-challenge is a typical cryptographic paradigm and has been widely used in zkp-ml since 2021 (zkCNN, Liu et al., CCS 2021; Kang et al., 2022, Scaling up Trustless DNN Inference with Zero-Knowledge Proofs). Operator-level optimizations also have prior work, and the authors even admit in the appendix that their implementation is highly similar in technical route to prior work.
  2. The experiments are insufficient and the related work coverage is incomplete. The baselines in Table 1 are neither comprehensive nor reasonable, since they are training iterations rather than inference. zkLLM, zkGPT, and other work closer to zkp+LLM inference are not included. The claimed fairness, membership inference, and safety objectives also lack experiments.
Questions for authors

Clarification questions:

  1. Novelty. Since the work is essentially a proof of inference, which parts of the protocol or the operator gadgets are new compared with zkLLM and zkGPT? How does your commit-then-challenge protocol differ from prior zkp-ml work such as zkCNN and Kang et al. (2022)?
  2. Baselines. Why does Table 1 compare against training iterations instead of zk proofs of LLM inference? Can you add a direct comparison with zkLLM and zkGPT on the same models and sequence length?
  3. Experiments. Can you report actual results for the claimed fairness, membership inference, and safety objectives?

Suggestion for future work (does not affect my score): Reframe the title and contributions as a proof of inference for trained models rather than a proof of training.

Reviewer_VgFmOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
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Paper summary

The paper introduces a system for zero-knowledge proof that a committed model attains some loss on a dataset that is only revealed after the model is committed.

Critical strengths

The paper is well written, and fairly easy to follow at a high level. It is not over-burdened with notation. The idea is interesting, and I am not aware of previous work with this exact system.

Critical weaknesses

I am a bit worried about the scope of the contribution. Knowing that zkLLM exists, it seems somewhat trivial that a trainer could do zero-knowledge inference on a held out dataset provided by an auditor after committing their model, so it seems the novel setting is that, instead of revealing the outputs of the inference, the trainer aggregates the model outputs into a single score and send it back to the auditor. However, if we fold the aggregation step into the model, it seems that this reduces directly back to zero-knowledge inference.

The claim seems to be that this system is a sufficient to serve in place of a zk proof of training, but I don't think that that is the case. The reason that one might want zk proof of training is that you don't want the trainer to do something malicious like introduce backdoors. This zk proof system provides no such guarantee.

Questions for authors

Please address my concerns under weaknesses if you can. I like the paper's writing style and the idea of faster zk proofs for training, but I worry that the contribution is only an incremental reformation of zk inference methods, and that it is insufficient for its stated goal of verifying training. Perhaps it would be better framed as a zk proof for benchmark performance on non-public benchmarks?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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